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Executive Summary 
 
 
In 2001, the Rwandan government began the phased introduction of a decentralisation programme 
throughout the country.  The new programme aimed at countering citizens‘ social, economic and 
political marginalisation which was widely viewed as constituting one of the principal drivers of the 
horrific genocide in 1994 in which almost one million Rwandans were brutally massacred.  This 
research aims at analysing the extent to which Rwanda‘s decentralisation process is meeting these 
aims. 
Employing a framework which differentiates between procedural participation (electoral 
participation); substantive participation (ongoing active participation in local decision making); and 
participation as cost-sharing (ongoing participation through financial contributions and voluntary 
labour), four main findings are discussed.  
 
First, although there is much talk among officials and commentators about bottom-up planning 
processes emanating from local village meetings (formerly ubudehe and now umuganda), and while 
such an ethos underpins the original Decentralisation Policy formulated in 2001, the accompanying 
legislation is somewhat scant in its references to such a form of participation as well as to 
mechanisms whereby this might take place.  Instead, a focus on community mobilisation in 
participation as cost-sharing is more apparent. 
 
Second, a shift in emphasis within the decentralisation programme over time is evident.  The current 
national strategy of fast-track economic development as a route out of poverty has been 
superimposed on the original goal of reconciliation and community building with an attendant 
emphasis on results over process.  This is evident in the 2013 revisions to the Decentralisation 
Policy as well as in the shift, during the second phase, from political decentralisation toward 
administrative decentralisation evidenced in the introduction of public management frameworks such 
as the imihigo and the emphasis on the administrative capacity of local leaders.  It is also evident in 
the demise of the local planning function of ubudehe which is now a social categorisation 
mechanism with final categories being decided by cell leaders.  This has necessitated in a shift in 
emphasis from substantive participation to participation as cost-sharing. 
 
Third, the findings from a) the comparison of local official and community priorities, and b) citizens‘ 
knowledge and use of local structures reveal no evidence of representation or accountability at 
district level where plans and policies appear heavily influenced by national prerogatives and where 
senior political figures are, paradoxically, both elected through the official system and strategically 
selected at national level.   These same findings reveal some evidence of responsiveness at sector and 
cell level however, where communications and contact with communities are more frequent.  
Although more aware of community priority issues and needs, local officials are constrained in their 
capacity to address these however, due to pressures to meet the ambitious targets set out in their 
imihigos which draw from higher level plans and targets. 
 
And fourth, of the three forms of participation examined, participation as cost-sharing emerges as the 
most common, with increasing emphasis placed on this in recent years as local entities are 
encouraged to move toward fiscal autonomy and self-reliance.  The heavy emphasis on this form of 
participation is viewed as problematic in a number of respects.   
 
Reflecting on these findings in the context of ongoing debates on the efficacy of supports to the 
process, three broad questions are posed.  First, given the parallels in international views of Rwanda 
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pre-1994 and Rwanda today, how ―good enough‖ does ―good enough governance‖ need to be?  
Second, is ―fast-track development‖ compatible with other peace-building objectives aimed at 
transforming the political space resulting in equity, social cohesion and local political legitimacy 
when the pressures of such a fast-track approach are dependent on high levels of cost-sharing by 
citizens?  And third, when placing capacity and capacity building at the heart of supports to the 
process, what and whose capacity do we mean?  Is it the capacity of communities to substantively 
interact with detailed administrative policy and budgetary mechanisms within a complex system or is 
it the capacity of the system to engage with community members as equals, valuing their knowledge 
and analysis, and developing the capacity, skills and tools to translate this into the necessary policy 
and budgetary frameworks?   
 
The report concludes with a reminder that decentralisation was not just the key mechanism through 
which communities were physically mobilised during the genocide, it was also (together with the aid 
industry more broadly), for decades running up to the genocide, one of the key mechanisms through 
which the conditions of structural violence (marginalisation, alienation, humiliation) that preceded 
and underpinned the genocide were disseminated and consolidated.  Decentralisation, like 
participation, is not, on its own, necessarily a good thing.  It depends on the underlying aims, 
ambitions and motivations of its adherents and supporters.  While it can certainly oppress, subjugate 
and alienate communities, leading to frustration, anger and physical revolt, it can also engage 
communities by opening up new political spaces and renewing the social contract between citizens 
and their leaders while building social cohesion and stability.  The important thing is to learn from 
and not replicate history.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2001, the Rwandan government began the phased introduction of a decentralisation programme 
throughout the country.  The new programme aimed at countering citizens‘ social, economic and 
political marginalisation which was widely viewed as constituting one of the principal drivers of the 
horrific genocide in 1994 in which almost one million Rwandans were brutally massacred.  This 
research, which forms part of a broader research project on Local Governance and Peacebuilding in 
the Great Lakes region, aims at analysing the extent to which Rwanda‘s decentralisation process is 
meeting these aims.
2
 
 
 
1.1  Research context 
 
The strong link between poverty, political, economic and social marginalisation and conflict is now 
well-established.  While much international intervention and research in the areas of conflict, 
peacebuilding and governance to date has focused on national elites and institutions, recent research 
is now emphasising the importance of local tensions in fuelling violence in most conflict and post-
conflict situations.  Two factors are of particular importance in this regard – the level of state 
legitimacy, authority and control at local levels, and equality of access to resources, services and 
basic necessities between and across different groups.  These two factors highlight the importance of 
local governance mechanisms – either formal or informal – in opening a political space for 
heretofore marginalised groups to actively participate in and share ownership of local developmental 
decision-making and prioritisation.  While such mechanisms are often presumed to open up such 
spaces, depending how they are understood, mobilised and supported, they can also reproduce and 
reinforce existing economic, social and political inequalities, exacerbating conflict.  The extent to 
which these mechanisms transform and/or constrain political space within Rwanda is the focus of the 
present research.   
 
 
1.2  Research aims 
 
Within this context the specific aims of this research are as follows:  
 
1. To assess the opportunities for and challenges to political engagement of citizens within 
governance structures at local levels across a select number of sites in Rwanda; 
2. To assess if particular groups experience particular barriers to engagement; 
3. To assess how engagement may affect political relations/tensions at local level; 
4. To examine how, if at all, this engagement might feed upward to higher political levels. 
 
                                                 
2
 The overall project examines local governance and peacebuilding in Burundi, DRC and Rwanda and is supported by the 
researcher‘s own institution, Dublin City University (DCU), the Royal Irish Academy (RIA) and by Trócaire.  The 
research reports are available at http://doras.dcu.ie/view/people/Gaynor,_Niamh.html. 
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1.3  Report Structure 
 
The report is divided into four main sections.  Following this introductory section, Section 2 outlines 
the design and methodology employed in gathering, coding and analysing the data.  The principal 
findings from documentary and field research are set out in Section 3.  Within this section, Section 
3.1 contextualises the decentralisation process through an examination of contrasting debates on the 
nature of the current Rwandan state; the different forms and understandings of participation and its 
link to peacebuilding; and the role of decentralisation in this regard.  Section 3.2 draws from relevant 
background literature, legislation and policy documentation to map out the principle structures and 
opportunities for participation within the current process.  Section 3.3 then examines how 
decentralisation works in practice through an analysis of the effectiveness and responsiveness of 
local structures to citizens‘ priorities; an analysis of the three different forms of participation within 
the process; and a discussion of the links between decentralisation and peacebuilding within this 
context.  The key issues emerging from the study are discussed in the final concluding section. 
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2.  Research design and methodology 
 
 
2.1 Research design 
 
Research for the study employs a mixed method approach drawing from relevant policy material, 
focus groups (FGs), interviews and a structured observation of an umuganda discussion.  In addition 
to an analysis of relevant texts on decentralisation (see Section 3.2.2 in particular), the research 
draws heavily on the views and perspectives of different actors, most particularly a random sample 
of approximately 135 ‗ordinary‘ men and women across six diverse sites in Rwanda‘s Northern and 
Southern provinces.   
 
The steps taken in carrying out this research are set out below. 
 
 
2.2  Secondary research 
 
A review of relevant secondary materials and literature was carried out from August-December 
2012.  This research focussed on Rwanda‘s broad political, economic and social contexts together 
with key lessons and learning from existing studies of local governance and peacebulding more 
specifically.  The relevant legislative and policy texts, where available, were also examined at this 
time.   
 
Drawing from this review, a framework of analysis fleshing out the broad research aims set out 
above was developed.  This was used to develop the semi-structured interview schedules (for 
different interview categories), FG guides, and the structured observation framework used in the 
fieldwork phase. 
 
 
2.3  Primary data collection: Field research  
 
Primary data collection took place over the months February to March, 2013.  The researcher spent 
one week in Kigali meeting with relevant national level actors and collecting relevant 
documentation.  This was followed by three weeks in six rural sites across five districts conducting 
interviews and with a random selection of citizens together with local elected and appointed officials 
as set out in Table 2.3a below.  The sites were selected by Trócaire following criteria set out by the 
researcher and agreed in advance with Trócaire
3
.  Data were collected in all of these sites by the 
researcher with the assistance of a freelance translator.  Two-three days were spent conducting field 
research in each site.   
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Criteria included geographic and socio-economic diversity as well as, to avoid bias, sites where Trócaire partners do not 
intervene.  Trócaire did, however, include one site where partners do intervene (Site A) at the last minute.  This 
introduced some bias into FGs but not into individual interviews as Trócaire partners were unknown to randomly 
selected individual interviewees. 
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Table 2.3a: Research sites
4
 
 
Province  District Sector Site 
Northern Gakenke Mataba A 
Northern Rulindo Bushoki B 
Southern Nyamagabe Cyanika C 
Southern Nyaruguru Ngoma D 
Southern  Gisagara Kansi E 
Southern Gisagara Kigembe F 
 
 
Overall, 59 individual citizen interviews, four FGs (of approximately 8-12 citizens depending on 
availability and willingness to participate) and 23 interviews with local leaders (appointed and 
elected) were conducted across the six sites.  Together with national level interviews this brings the 
total number of research participants to approximately 135.  In addition, a structured observation of 
an Umuganda meeting in Kigali was carried out.  Focus groups and individual interviews with 
citizens were conducted separately with women and men.  Participants for individual interviews were 
selected randomly on transect walks through sites and no prior notice was given before arriving on 
site.  Participants for FGs were identified by local civil society leaders following criteria set out by 
the researcher
5
.  A breakdown of research participants is provided in Table 2.3b below: 
 
                                                 
4
 The Cell and Village / Agglomeration within each site was also recorded but there are omitted here to maintain 
anonymity.   
5
 These local civil society leaders are Trócaire‘s local partners.  As noted in Section 2.5, FGs did not prove very effective 
and so were abandoned after one week‘s trial. 
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Table 2.3b: Research participants 
 
National level  Interviews Focus groups  
(comprising 8-12 people) 
International agencies based 
in Kigali 
8 
 
 
National agencies based in 
Kigali 
3 
(IRDP; RALGA; RCSP) 
 
Ministry personnel and 
government agencies based 
in Kigali 
2 
(NDIS; RGB) 
 
District level   
Elected councillors 4 
(1 mayor; 3 vice-mayors)  
 
 
Appointed officials  5 
(1 Executive Secretary; 2 Budget 
Officers; 1 Good Governance 
Officer; 1 Permanent Secretary of 
JADF) 
 
Sector level   
Elected councillors 3 
(2 Presidents and 1 member of 
sector councils)  
 
Appointed officials  5 
(all Executive Secretaries) 
 
Cell level   
Elected councillors 1 
(President Council) 
 
Appointed officials  5 
(all Executive Secretaries) 
 
Village level   
Rwandan citizens – random 
sample  
59 
(30 female and 29 male) 
4 
(2 female and 2 male) 
TOTAL 95 4 (approx. 40 people) 
 
 
Interviews in Kigali sought to explore actors‘ views on and strategies around the formal 
decentralisation process over time.  Relevant legislative and policy materials were also sourced.  
Interviews with local authorities explored their understandings of their roles; the priority 
development issues in their jurisdictions; and their understandings of the concepts of representation 
and participation.  Interviews and FGs with randomly selected citizens explored a wide range of 
issues including changes over time in the region; development priorities for them; their awareness 
and use of local governance structures; and their attitudes towards politics and political leaders more 
broadly.   
 
The 30 women and 29 men interviewed individually are aged between 21 and 68 and their average 
age is 39.  68% are married, 15% are single, 7% are widowed and 10% are divorced or separated
6
.  
By far the most common occupation among individual interviewees is farming (80% - 85% female; 
75% male) with over half (51% - 53% female; 48% male) farming at a subsistence level just to feed 
their family and 29% (31% female; 26% male) also growing some produce to sell at certain times of 
                                                 
6
 During the course of conversation, in a number of instances it emerged that people who characterised themselves as 
‗married‘ at the outset are now either divorced or their spouses were killed or have fled.  Therefore it is probable that the 
actual percentage of married people is lower and that of divorced / separated / single higher than those recorded here. 
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the year.  8.5% of interviewees (6% female; 11% male) work as state agents (principally teachers 
and/or health workers), 5% (6% female; 5% male) are labourers for others; 3% (all male) work in 
street trading / ‗petit commerce‘, and 3% (2% female; 4% male) are self-employed.  The ubudehe7 
categories of interviewees are set out in Figure 2.3 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Ubudehe categories (as % of total) of individual interviewees 
0
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As Figure 2.3 outlines, 2% of individual interviewees (all women) are in ubudehe category 1; 19% 
(22% female; 15% male) are in category 2; 64% (59% female; 70% male) are in category 3 and 5% 
(6% female; 4% male) are in category 4.  10% of interviewees (9% female; 11% male) did not know 
what ubudehe category they are in. 
 
 
 
2.4  Coding, analysis and documentation 
 
Individual interviews with all research participants were conducted using open-ended questionnaires.  
Interviews in Kigali and with local authorities in each of the six research sites were conducted using 
a semi-structured interview guide.  Interviews with randomly selected individual citizens employed a 
structured open-ended questionnaire.  FGs were conducted using a FG guide covering the same 
themes as the structured open-ended questionnaire. 
 
Data from the 59 individual citizen interviews were coded after the fact and input by the researcher 
to the computer package SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) to allow for some 
descriptive statistical analysis.  Cross-tabulation tables were generated through SPSS to provide a 
gender disaggregation.  The findings were also analysed to see if significant differences existed 
between different sites.  Gender disaggregated findings from these interviews are provided 
throughout the report and site disaggregated findings are reported where significant differences exist.   
 
All FGs and semi-structured interviews were recorded and transcribed in full by the researcher.  
These transcribed texts were then coded and the data collated.  Combined with the data from the 
individual interviews and structured observation, the resultant data forms the basis for this report.   
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Section 3.3.4 for more on ubudehe. 
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2.5  Research limitations 
 
All research designs have their limitations and this research project is no exception.  The very 
particular socio-political context in which the research was conducted (see Section 3.1) gives rise to 
three principle limitations in this case.  First, the qualitative nature of the study, employing a 
relatively small sample size, does not allow for statistically significant generalisation.  That said, the 
relatively high level of similarity in findings across all sites does suggest that these findings are 
reflective of wider trends.  While the quantitative survey-based methods favoured by Rwanda‘s 
National Institute for Statistical Research (NISR) and various other Rwandan agencies allow for 
more confidence in such generalisations, qualitative approaches such as those employed here allow 
for a deeper exploration of the issues raised as well as leaving scope for participants to raise 
additional issues they deem important.  This is important in a context where, as a number of research 
participants noted, citizens have, through practice, learned the ‗correct‘ answer to familiar questions 
posed through EICV
8
 surveys, citizen scorecards and other commonly used survey instruments.   
 
A second allied limitation is the culture of caution and fear which permeates social and political life 
in Rwanda.  As one research participant notes: 
 
Everyone has a need to talk about what is problematic for them. But if somebody comes in 
from outside and starts asking questions they are afraid of what is going to happen. Because 
it could happen.
 9
 
 
This is understandable given the authorities‘ ardent efforts to control the story of Rwanda and data 
around this (as discussed further in Section 3.1).  For this reason, the initial research design for this 
project relied more heavily on structured observations of both umuganda and ubudehe discussions.  
However, field research revealed that these ubudehe processes are much less frequent in practice and 
umuganda works often take place without the associated community meetings (see Section 3.3.4).  
Thus opportunities for such observations were very limited.  Initial FG discussions were also limited 
in effectiveness as a) participants appeared to be strategically selected rather than chosen following 
the agreed criteria; and b) their wariness (of each other) hampered discussion and exchange between 
them which is central to the FG method.  Consequently FGs were abandoned after a week in favour 
of more lengthy, in-depth interviews with randomly selected individuals.  With confidentiality and 
anonymity assured, research participants appeared more relaxed and open to discussing and sharing 
their views on pertinent issues on an individual basis.   
 
This caution extends to national and district level actors and a third limitation was a difficulty in 
securing interviews with officials at these levels.  Repeated requests for an interview with the 
Ministry for Local Government (MINALOC) were ignored, international agencies were wary, and 
district level Mayors and Executive Secretaries also proved elusive.  For these reasons of sensitivity 
and caution, the anonymity of all research participants has been assured.  Interviewees are only 
referred to by category (international agency representative; cell leader etc.) rather than by name, and 
the specific (cell, village) research locations are omitted.    
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Integrated National Household Living Conditions Survey 
9
 Interviewee Kigali, 12/02/2013 
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3.  Research findings and analysis 
 
This section presents and discusses the principal findings from the research.  Section 3.1 below 
historicises debates and research on the nature and function of the Rwandan state and, drawing on 
participation theory more broadly, identifies three forms of participation which are employed as a 
framework for this study.  Findings from documentary research are presented in Section 3.2 where 
some more background on the origins and development of the current process are provided together 
with an analysis of the relevant policy and legislative materials and structures.  Section 3.3 then uses 
findings from the field research to analyse the effectiveness and responsiveness of local structures 
and the three different forms of participation and their distributional implications respectively. 
 
 
3.1  Background to the Study: Participation, decentralisation and conflict 
 
The following section draws on broader literature and research to provide a context to the study and 
an overall framework for the research.  The very particular and vigorously contested nature of the 
Rwandan state is discussed in Section 3.1.1.  The historical salience of these contemporary debates 
are discussed in Section 3.1.2 where the links between particular conceptions of participation and 
structural violence are highlighted.  The third section reviews the main empirical studies on 
Rwanda‘s current decentralisation process and presents a framework for this study.   
 
 
3.1.1  Debating Rwanda: Developmental state or dictatorship? 
 
The level of debate and literature on Rwanda‘s development since the aftermath of the 1994 
genocide is noteworthy for both its volume and its intensely polarised nature.  On the one hand, 
commentators and scholars celebrate the remarkable developmental achievements of this small, 
landlocked, resource-poor state recovering from the trauma of a horrific genocide.  On the other, 
critics are sharply critical of the authoritarian, top-down style of governance which, they argue, 
employs a discourse of national unity and reconciliation to silence political opposition and dissent. 
 
Among many commentators, and particularly among the international development community, 
Rwanda has been hailed as a remarkable success-story and a showcase for post-conflict 
reconstruction.  Well-known journalists such as Kinzer (2008), Gourevitch (2009), Zakira (2009) and 
Crisafulli and Redmond (2012) have been glowing in their praise, documenting the rapid economic 
transformation and highlighting, in particular, the role of President Paul Kagame in this regard.  
Kagame has been heralded as a ‗visionary leader‘ by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair.  In 
2009, he was presented with the Clinton Global Citizen Award by former US President Bill Clinton
10
 
and, that same year, both Time magazine
11
 and the Financial Times
12
 named him as one of the 50 
most influential people of the new millennium.  Several scholars have also highlighted the 
remarkable achievements of the Kagame regime (Golooba-Mutedi, 2008; Ensign and Bertrand, 
2009; Stansell, 2009; and Clark, 2010).  There is much substance to these claims.  In the 10 year 
period between 1994 and 2004, Rwanda registered average growth rates of 10% and has sustained 
                                                 
10
http://www.clintonglobalinitiative.org/Newsmedia/newsmedia_pressreleases_92309c.asp?Section=NewsMedia.  
11
 ―The 2009 Time 100: Paul Kagame‖, Time, April 30th, 2009. 
12
 ―Fifty Faces That Shaped the Decade‖, Financial Times, December 28th, 2009. 
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rates of approximately 5% since then.  The country is on track to meet most of its Millennium 
Development Goal by 2015 and, at 56.3%
13
, is now ranked world number one for the proportion of 
female parliamentarians in the national assembly.  It is known as the ―Singapore of Africa‖ for its 
rapid modernisation and diversification of its economy, together with its civil service which is 
reported to be largely free of corruption (Zorbas, 2011).  Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) 
differentiate Rwanda from the more pejorative neo-patrimonial characterisations of other African 
regimes characterising it as a ―developmental-patrimonial‖ state aimed at long-term development 
rather than short-term personal gain. 
 
These overwhelmingly positive accounts notwithstanding, a growing number of critics highlight 
some more negative and darker undertones to this transformation.  Possibly the most well-known are 
the widespread allegations of ongoing political interference and looting in Eastern Congo (Reyntjens, 
2009; Prunier, 2011; UNSC 2012) – allegations which the government continues to deny but which 
led to the suspension of international aid late last year.  Closer to home critics highlight a) the 
intimidation and intolerance of political opposition using charges of divisionism and ―genocidal 
ideology‖ (Reyntjens, 2004; 2010; Straus, 2006); b) the failure of a range of government policies 
including Gacaca (Waldorf, 2011); Umuganda - the controversial villagisation programme 
(Newbury, 2011); and the government‘s attempted social engineering in rural areas (Ansoms, 2008, 
2009); c) the top-down, authoritarian nature of governance (Ansoms, 2011; Desrosiers and Thomson, 
2011; Purdeková, 2011); and d) excessive control of the media, information and narratives on the 
Rwandan story more broadly (Poettier, 2002; Beswick, 2010; Frère et al, 2010; Ingelaere, 2010; and 
Reyntjens, 2010).  Perhaps the subject of less scrutiny, but linked to the last point, are growing 
questions around the correlations between the high growth rates and levels of poverty and inequality 
throughout the country.  While many sources such as the IMF draw on MINECOFIN data to report 
significant reductions in both poverty (from 57% in 2006 to 45% in 2011) and inequality over the 
last 5 years (a declining Gini coefficient from 0.52 in 2006 to 0.49 in 2011) (IMF, 2012: 5), UNDP 
data suggest otherwise citing a Gini coefficient of 0.53 in its most recent report making Rwanda the 
fifth most unequal society in Africa
14
 (UNDP, 2013: 154).  While these contrasting figures might 
well be simply reflective of differing data collation methods and time-series analyses, robust official 
criticism of independently sourced data more generally suggests a more strategic effort to control 
emerging data and narratives on the country‘s trajectory.15 
 
So where do international aid agencies stand with regard to these criticisms?  While concerns about 
Rwanda‘s alleged interference in Eastern Congo have recently resurfaced, with donor agencies 
                                                 
13
 http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm.  
14
 It is surpassed only by Angola, the Central African Republic, the Comoros islands, and Zambia. 
15
 For example, Ingelaere (2011) notes that, in 2007 Finance Minister Musoni, having signed off on a UNDP report 
which was sharply critical of the government‘s limited achievements in poverty reduction, went on to publicly disavow 
the report and that, in 2009, the government halted a World Bank study into rural livelihoods.  Last year the RGB 
challenged Rwanda‘s ranking in the Mo Ibrahim governance index, criticising the index as being Western-dominated 
(despite the fact that the index draws from, inter alia ADB and Ghana‘s Centre for Democratic Development data) and 
failing to take into account data produced by Rwanda‘s own institutions (―Mo Ibrahim Index Challenged‖, The New 
Times, October 18
th
, 2012).  A number of international agencies who have commissioned independent studies report that 
their findings, where differing from official findings, have not been accepted by national authorities (interviews Kigali).  
Finally, last year, the government introduced an authorisation system whereby a ‗research visa‘ must be obtained through 
the NISR to carry out research in Rwanda.  Obtaining this visa for this research proved quite difficult with the request 
initially turned down for the following reason, “As similar research have [sic] been undertaken this could lead to some 
contradiction of with [sic] the existing findings‖ (email communication, François Kambogo, NISR, November 20th, 
2012). 
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cutting their aid in late 2012, aid agencies have, in general, remained less critical of internal 
governance issues.  Hayman argues that this is because donors are more concerned with 
developmental outcomes and meeting the MDGs than with governance per se (2011: 126), and in 
echoes of Grindle‘s (2004) influential exhortation towards “good enough governance”, she argues 
that ―good enough democracy” proves sufficient for donors at present in Rwanda.   Zorbas (2011) 
attributes donor‘s ongoing support to four factors – genocidal guilt; the Rwandan government‘s 
increasing donor-friendly language and positioning; the desire for African ‗success stories‘; and the 
lack of domestic opposition to the RPF regime in the main bilaterial donor countries of the US and 
the UK.  This general apparent lack of concern regarding internal governance issues appears to be 
changing with developments in recent months however.  For example, while the EU has said it will 
continue with existing aid projects, direct budgetary support of up to €70m (£56m) over six years has 
effectively been suspended while other donors have reinstated suspended aid on a sectoral and not on 
a budget support basis as previously
16
.   
So what is the relevance of these debates to Rwanda‘s current decentralisation process?  Their 
relevance lies in their historical salience – most notably in relation to historical legacies of 
decentralisation, citizen participation and development in Rwanda – legacies which, as we will see 
below, resonate strongly with contemporary developments. 
 
3.1.2  Structural violence, decentralisation and participation 
 
In his provocative and highly influential book on the 1994 genocide and the role of the aid 
community within this, Aiding Violence, Peter Uvin argues that violence in Rwanda pre-1994 was a 
structural process characterised by longstanding dynamics of exclusion, marginalisation, inequality, 
frustration, humiliation and racism (1998: 7).  These dynamics, he argues, were promoted by national 
and local state and aid officials alike.  Focusing on the critical question of why ordinary people opted 
to actively participate in brutal violence against their neighbours, Uvin argues that the anomie and 
frustration caused by this long-standing condition of structural violence coupled with the state‘s 
intrusion into all aspects of social life constituted an important factor in motivating civil violence.   
 
Four aspects of Uvin‘s comprehensive and compelling analysis of this critical period in Rwanda‘s 
history are worth highlighting here in respect to current trends and developments.  First, Rwanda was 
widely perceived, especially within the development community, as a developmental success story.  
As Uvin (2008: 42) notes “The image of Rwanda created by the development community was an 
idyllic one.  In brief, it was the image of a country of subsistence farmers faced with daunting 
economic and demographic challenges but endowed with a government that followed the right 
policies, the fruits of which the hardworking population enjoyed.”  Indeed, the data emerging at the 
time bore this out.  Economic growth was high, industrial production, services, domestic investment, 
exports, paved roads, telephone lines, electricity consumption were all growing fast and Rwanda, in 
1990-1993, was placed among the three most advanced countries in sub-Saharan Africa (1998: 47-
48).  Second, although World Bank reports at the time asserted that poverty and inequality were not 
serious problems, Uvin‘s own analysis - combining data on food expenditures and under-nutrition 
with local land and income inequality studies of the 1980s – demonstrates acute and rising inequality 
                                                 
16
 ―Suspended aid could return to Rwanda but on different terms‖, Michel Arrion, Head of the EU Delegation to Rwanda, 
The East African, February 2
nd
, 2013. See also ―Donors restore aid to Rwanda‖, The Independent, March 22nd, 2013.  
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during this time.  Third, he argues that this inequality was due to the functioning of a socio-political 
system based on multiple exclusions and disempowerments.   Included within these were processes 
of humiliation and disempowerment embedded within the interactions between the state/aid system 
and the large majority of poor Rwandans typified by top-down extension services and authorities 
(1998: 118-126).  For Uvin, prejudice existed in pre-genocide Rwanda in not just one (the official 
Hutu racist ideology), but in two forms.  The second was the prejudice of the evolués – the urban, 
educated, modern, ‗developed‘ people among state and aid officials alike – toward their rural, 
illiterate, ‗underdeveloped‘ brothers.  “Through that prejudice, which is widespread in Africa and 
the rest of the Third World, the poor were considered backward, ignorant, and passive – almost 
subhuman – and were treated in a condescending, paternalistic, and humiliating manner.” (1998: 
128).  And fourth, one of the principal vehicles for this exclusion, manipulation, disempowerment 
and humiliation was the country‘s decentralisation process which, although designed to promote 
local-level, participatory development planning and project implementation at commune level, in 
reality served to promote centralised interests and plans.  Thus, as Uvin (1998: 24-25) recalls 
 
One of the first acts of the new Habyarimana regime in 1974 was the pronouncement by its 
president of a programme that attributed to Rwanda‟s 143 communes the role of „motor of 
development‟.  From now on, the communes would be the basic unit of development – forums 
for local-level, participatory development planning and project implementation... However, 
from the beginning, the structure and functioning of the commune ran counter to this 
development discourse...   
 
Thus, foremost among their [commune‘s] hierarchy of tasks are the maintenance of public 
order and the resolution of disputes; the implementation of decrees, circulars, decisions, and 
instructions from the Ministry of the Interior; the collection of taxes of all kinds; the relaying 
of political messages from the central party to the community („political mobilisation‟); and 
the organisation of obligatory community labour. 
 
Thus, according to Uvin‘s extensively researched account, while Rwanda at the time was widely 
perceived as a development success story – rapidly modernising with efficient decentralised 
structures throughout the country maintaining public order and mobilising the masses into quiet, 
industrious labour, unpinning this veneer was growing popular frustration and discontent with 
growing horizontal inequalities, political and social marginalisation and routine humiliation.  While 
the governance system provided for, and indeed depended on, citizen participation, it remained 
participation as dictated by the upper echelons of society – be they state or aid agencies – and its 
benefits were not always readily apparent to citizens.  In this context, it is worth thinking a little 
more deeply about what participation means – to whom, and for what purpose.  
While ubiquitous in development discourse and practice, participation means very different things to 
different people.  It can also be invoked and used to achieve very different outcomes.  Discussion 
and debate on its many meanings, in a range of different contexts, has been ongoing for many 
decades.  The useful typologies or ladders or participation produced by, among others, Arnstein 
(1969), Pretty (1995) and White (1996) highlight these multiple contested meanings and draw 
attention to the consequent range of outcomes possible.  For example, Arnstein‘s famous ―ladder of 
participation‖ as depicted in Figure 3.1.2 below outlines nine forms of participation ranging from - 
at one end of the spectrum - simple manipulation of citizens to – at the other end - transformative, 
emancipatory outcomes where citizens deliberate and decide on policy outcomes themselves.  These 
contributions help illustrate that while, for some, participation may serve a purely instrumental 
function, making projects and activities more cost effective by drawing on community‘s own 
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resources, for others it may aim at empowerment – strengthening communities‘ confidence and 
abilities to take decisions, hold political leaders to account and ultimately control their own destinies.   
 
Figure 3.1.2: Arnstein’s ladder of participation 
 
 
 
 
The lesson from these contributions is that citizen participation, in and of itself, is not necessarily a 
good thing.  It all depends on what is understood by it, how it is employed, and who gains and who 
loses when it is invoked.  Uvin‘s research has demonstrated that the form of participation promoted 
by government and aid officials pre-1994 coupled with the social and economic marginalisation of 
large swathes of the country‘s rural population led to frustration, resentment and anger which 
ultimately and brutally surfaced in the 1994 genocide.  It is therefore pertinent to focus on the 
form(s) of participation promoted within the current decentralisation process, as well as examining 
its effectiveness and performance more broadly.  A good starting point in this is a brief review of 
studies on the process to date. 
 
 
 
 
3.1.3  Findings from previous studies on Rwanda’s decentralisation process 
 
There are few in-depth empirical studies to date on political decentralisation within Rwanda and 
fewer still which go beyond a documentary analysis to examine its application on the ground.  That 
said, a number of studies have been conducted in recent years which are useful and relevant.  Both 
van Tilberg (2008) and MINALOC (2013a), drawing primarily from documentary sources, highlight 
the significant political reforms enshrined within the current process and both remain cautiously 
optimistic.  Van Tilberg (2008: 228) concludes that ―...the process of decentralisation and the 
accompanying attempts towards good governance have contributed towards a more legitimate 
political order, i.e. a more stable political context that before 1994” but sounds a warning note that 
is is still early days and, with citizen participation not yet firmly embedded with these structures, 
―stability cannot yet be guaranteed”.   
 
MINALOC (2013a) stresses the robust legislative framework underpinning the process which places 
participation at its core. 
  
...citizen participation in decision making is one of [the] key elements of [the] national 
decentralization policy adopted in 2000 and revised in 2013.  By law local government 
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authorities are required to conform to participatory process[es] in planning and budgeting 
as well as other processes in their area of jurisdiction.  They are also required to prepare 
five-year development plans through a bottom-up approach starting from the village plans 
which feed into cells and sector level.  Most importantly, citizens participate in planning 
process[es] directly at the village and cell levels, and indirectly through elected 
representatives at the sector and district level.   
         MINALOC (2013a: x) 
 
While MINALOC‘s account is generally extremely positive, it does acknowledge that citizen‘s 
participation in local elections, community labour and financial contributions remain much higher in 
practice than their participation in planning and decision-making.  It draws this conclusion from data 
produced by the Rwanda Governance Board‘s (RGB) Citizen Report Card.  These findings are 
reproduced in Table 3.1.3 at the end of this section.  Significantly, MINALOC attributes the lack of 
citizen participation in planning and decision-making to a lack of capacity on the part of citizens 
themselves (MINALOC, 2013a: 18) rather than to any shortcomings within the process or its leaders. 
 
A decidedly more critical verdict on the process is delivered by Bert Ingelaere who focuses his 
attention on the first local elections held in 2006.  Ingelaere observed these elections in a village in 
the Northern Province and interviewed a number of local citizens around these.  In contrast to 
official observer reports, he reports a degree of political intimidation and manipulation and draws 
some worrying parallels with the pre-1994 process.  In his own words, 
 
 ... under the guise of „decentralisation‟, the RPF has actually expanded the central state‟s 
political reach down to the local level.  Crucial to understanding this process is the fact that 
locally elected representatives have been displaced by centrally appointed authorities.  Not 
surprisingly then, accountability in local governance structures flows upward to central 
authorities, not downward to the population.... the RPF has created parallel channels of 
command and control in the countryside to maintain centralised control over the population.  
These developments are worrying because top-down and authoritarian power structures are 
precisely what made the administration of violence so viciously efficient in 1994. 
Ingelaere (2011: 68) 
 
 
A more nuanced, although also somewhat critical account is provided by the IRDP following 
extensive field research involving 40 FGs with local authorities and citizens across 10 randomly 
selected districts.  The findings from this study reveal strong, ongoing ―centralist tendencies‖ (IRDP, 
2011a: 27) among local authorities and citizens alike with 53% of citizens feeling that decisions 
should be taken at central level and just 36% feeling that they should be taken at local level (4% by 
local authorities and 32% by the population) (IRDP, 2011a: 40).  Possibly the most revealing finding 
from this study is that 74% of citizens claim not to have been involved in the development of policies 
and programmes, while 61% of leaders reveal that they did not consult the local population in 
decision making processes (IRDP, 2011a: 44). These latter findings are echoed by the Africa Peer 
Review Mechanism in its Rwanda country report when it speaks of “a rehearsed participation in 
public affairs as determined by political authorities” (APRM, 2006: 127).  Notwithstanding their 
lack of participation in decision-making, 89% of citizens report participating in the implementation 
and execution of local programmes through community labour and local taxes (IRDP, 2011a: 45). 
 
These findings resonate with those produced through the Citizen Report Card process of the RGB 
and are largely accepted by MINALOC who, as noted above, attributes these findings to insufficient 
capacity among citizens rather than any shortcomings within the process itself.  We will return to this 
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latter point later, as it is one which was constantly reiterated by civil society interviewees during this 
research and, in the context of legacies of structural violence discussed above, merits further 
consideration.  An important point of focus here however is the three main forms of participation 
employed within Rwanda‘s current decentralisation process which are highlighted by these studies.  
Within this study I have characterised these as a) procedural (electoral participation); b) substantive 
(ongoing participation through local meetings); and c) cost-sharing (ongoing participation through 
financial contributions and voluntary labour).  These categorisations provide a framework for this 
study and will be examined in turn in Section 3.3.  Before turning to a detailed examination of these 
however, it is useful to note that the findings from the RGB‘s Citizen Report Card which is 
reproduced in multiple government documents indicate a strong emphasis on cost-sharing and a 
weak emphasis on substantive forms of participation within Rwanda‘s local governance system as 
reflected in Table 3.1.3 below. The ‗Activity‘ and ‗Percentage population‘ columns within the table 
reproduce data from the RGB Citizen Report Card.  I have introduced the ‗Form of participation‘ 
column to highlight the important differences in aims and outcomes of the different activities.   
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Table 3.1.3  Forms of participation in local governance 
 
Ranking Activity Form of participation Percentage of 
population 
participating (%) 
1 Community development 
works / umuganda 
Cost-sharing 93 
2 Election of local leaders Procedural 92 
3 Financial contributions Cost-sharing 85 
4 Speaking at local meetings Substantive?? 
17
 82 
5 Assigned voluntary work 
in local administration 
Cost-sharing 66 
6 Monitoring services & 
holding leaders 
accountable 
Substantive 37 
7 Formulation of district 
council agenda 
Substantive 35 
8 Elaboration of district 
budgets 
Substantive 35 
9 Formulation of DDPs Substantive 34 
10 Formulation of Imihigo 
performance contract 
activities 
Substantive 31 
 
Source: Adapted from MINALOC (2013: 18 – Table 1) 
 
 
Overall therefore, studies to date, while varying considerably in their final verdicts on the process, 
implicitly point to some links with the past in that participation appears primarily understood and 
mobilised as cost sharing through communal labour and financial contributions / local taxes.  
Bearing in mind the historical legacies of the process, the remainder of this study will seek to explore 
the reasons for this and the possible implications, as well as examining the effectiveness and 
performance of the process more broadly.   
 
 
                                                 
17
 The degree to which this represents substantive participation depends on whether the contribution is a question, 
comment or proposal – see my analysis in this regard in Section 3.3.4.  It is also highly dependent on the degree to which 
the comment or proposal is acted upon by authorities. 
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3.2   Decentralisation in theory 
 
The following section draws from both interviews and analysis of relevant documentation to set out 
the underlying philosophy and structures of decentralisation as set out in the different texts and 
strategies.  The first sub-section sets the process in a historical context and takes us through the three 
phases of its development since its introduction in its current form in 2000.  The main philosophy 
underlying the current process is set out in Section 3.2.2 while the final sub-section outlines the 
structures and roles at the different levels. 
 
 
3.2.1  Evolution of decentralisation 
 
Like its neighbours Burundi and the DRC, decentralisation has a long history within Rwanda.  
During the first (1962-1973) and second (1973-1994) so-called ‗Hutu Republics‘, society was 
organised into prefectures (provinces), communes, sectors, cells, and groupings of ten households 
known as nyumbakumi.  Each commune was run by a Bourgmestre who was appointed by the 
President.  The Bourgmestre‟s position resembled that of the local chiefs prior to the 1959 revolution 
with the entire structure operating in a tightly controlled top-down manner (Reyntjens, 1987; 
Ingelaere, 2011).  As noted previously, many commentators (Human Rights Watch, 1994; Reyntjens, 
1994; Uvin, 1998; Ingelaere, 2011, Prunier, 2011) highlight the crucial role played by these 
decentralised authorities in disseminating central orders and directing the genocidal violence and 
killing within their jurisdictions in 1994. 
 
The current decentralisation policy, adopted in 2000, set out plans for the introduction of a new form 
of decentralisation over a phased basis (RoR, 2001a).  Phase I (2000-2005) introduced territorial 
reform.  Sous-prefectures were abolished and communes were replaced by districts.  Phase I also 
introduced ubudehe – an innovative, local, participatory planning process involving social mapping, 
poverty categorisation and prioritisation of development activities and projects by communities 
themselves
18
.  The principal aim of decentralisation at this time was the promotion of reconciliation 
and social reconstruction across the country
19
.   
 
More sweeping territorial reform was introduced in Phase II (2006-2010).  In January 2006, the 
number of provinces was reduced from 11 to 4; of districts (from 106 to 30); of sectors (from 1,545 
to 416) and of cells (down from 9,201) (RoR, 2005).  Boundaries were redrawn and most localities 
and major towns took on new names, some of which were inspired by pre-colonial Rwanda 
(Ingalaere, 2011).  The administrative roles of these territorial entities were also redefined during this 
phase by removing the autonomy of provinces and transferring the principle coordinating and 
financial functions to the districts.  A new administrative structure, the umudugudu – village or 
agglomeration created through the government‘s controversial villagisation policy (also known as 
umudugudu) – was also introduced during this phase.  Notably, this phase witnessed a concerted shift 
from political to administrative functions with a marked emphasis on increasing the administrative 
capacity of local authorities as the aim of decentralisation shifted from reconciliation to economic 
development and service delivery
20
.  The first series of local elections was held throughout the 
country in 2006.   
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 Ubudehe is examined in detail in Section 3.3.4. 
19
 Interview state representative, 12/02/2013. 
20
 Interviews state representative, 12/02/2013 and national NGO 06/03/2013.  
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The third and current phase (2011-2015) aims ―...to deepen and sustain grassroots-based democratic 
governance and promote equitable local development by enhancing citizen participation and 
strengthening the local government system, while maintaining effective functional and mutually 
accountable linkages between Central and Local Governments entities.‖ (MINALOC, 2013b: 8). 
 
Imihigo 
In tandem with the increased concentration on administrative reforms and the shift toward economic 
development and service delivery, a new form of accountability known as imihigo or performance 
contracts was introduced and consolidated during Phase II of the process.  In their traditional form, 
imihigos were public vows made by leaders of communities to honour them with their bravery.  They 
emphasised leaders‘ duties to their citizens and their accountability in this regard.  In their current 
incarnation they constitute signed agreements or contracts between local officials and their superiors 
to meet specific targets within specific timeframes.  Imihigos are signed by officials at all levels 
(district, sector, cell and village) and have recently been introduced at household level also.  The 
strong influence of the aid industry‘s results-based management system is apparent as contemporary 
imihigos bear a striking resemblance to logframes and results-based matrices (see Appendix II for an 
example of an imihigo from one of the research sites).  Local officials‘ (and households‘) progress in 
meeting their targets are monitored on a regular (monthly at cell and sector level; annually at district 
level) basis and prizes are awarded by President Kagame for the ―top performing‖ districts at a high 
level national ceremony each year
21
.  As noted in Section 4.1.3 below, even households now sign 
imihigos with their village leaders.  While the imihigo concept is hailed by the government as an 
effective tool of accountability which provides for ―healthy competition that draws together all 
stakeholders to improve their own communities
22‖, the findings from this study indicate that, as it is 
currently being implemented, imihigos consolidate upward accountability and pressures to achieve 
targets set at senior levels, in the process narrowing considerably the space for both downward 
accountability and citizen participation.  This is discussed further in Sections 3.3 and 4. 
 
 
3.2.2  Relevant texts and policy 
 
Decentralisation is enshrined within the 2003 Constitution (specifically Article 167 – RoR, 2003) 
and there is a large body of legal and policy documentation underpinning the process.  These include 
two key laws determining the decentralised administrative entities (RoR, 2005) and the organisation 
and function of the district (RoR, 2006b) respectively; a Presidential Order determining the structure 
and functioning of villages, cells and sectors (RoR, 2006a) two key policies – the National 
Decentralisation Policy – first formulated in 2000 and revised this year (RoR, 2001a; MINALOC 
2013b) and the Community Development Policy – first formulated in 2001 and revised in 2008 (RoR, 
2001b; 2008); and a number of additional plans and strategies – notably the five year Implementation 
Programmes/Plans (MINALOC, 2004; 2010) and the Strategic Frameworks/Plans (MINALOC, 
2007; 2012).  
 
As noted previously, the new decentralisation programme introduced in 2001 aimed at countering the 
centralised, authoritarian system of governance which was widely blamed as constituting a major 
factor in the 1994 genocide.  The 2001 Policy succinctly captures the inter-related problems of 
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 See for example ―Kicukiro emerges best District‖, The New Times, August 24th, 2012. 
22
 ―Kagame‘s speech at the Seventh Commonwealth Local Government Conference‖, The New Times, May 16th, 2013. 
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previous decentralised regimes as including the inadequate participation of the population in 
decision-making; inadequate financial resources at lower levels; lack of accountability and 
transparency in local management structures; the accumulation of powers in one person – the 
bourgmestre; a passivity and dependency among the population caused by centralisation and their 
exclusion from participation; and ―an officialdom which erodes further the people‟s say in the 
management of their affairs, the system being generally accountable to central government instead 
of being accountable to the people” (RoR, 2001a: 4).  The resultant aim of the new decentralisation 
programme was thus to transform this system, affording citizens a voice in their own communities‘ 
development.  ―The overall objective of the decentralization policy is to ensure political, economic, 
social, managerial/administrative and technical empowerment of local populations to fight poverty 
by participating in planning and management of their development process.” (RoR, 2001a: 8).  The 
new programme therefore places the substantive participation of Rwanda‘s citizens at its very core. 
 
In 2013, following a review of progress to date, the 2001 policy was revised.  A comparison of the 
2001 and 2013 revised policy objectives reveals two shifts in emphasis and three new objectives.  
The first shift is a greater emphasis on rapid economic growth at local levels.  It also introduces the 
idea of local fiscal autonomy.  This is reflected in the third objective of the revised policy which 
aims ―to fast-track and sustain equitable local economic development as a basis for enhancing 
local fiscal autonomy, employment and poverty reduction, by empowering local communities and 
local governments to explore and utilize local potentials, prioritise and proactively engage in 
economic transformation activities at local, national and regional levels, and ensure fiscal 
discipline.” (MINALOC, 2013b: 8, emphasis in original).  The second shift in emphasis envisages a 
greater role for central authorities in local planning.  While the original policy stressed the 
importance of decentralised, local planning – as set out in objectives (iii) ―to develop planning, 
financing, management and control of service provision at the point where services are provided‟ 
and (iv) ―to develop planning at local levels” of the policy, the revised policy proves somewhat 
ambiguous in this regard.  While on the one hand, its first objective reiterates the commitment to 
substantive citizen participation in local planning – ―To enhance and sustain citizens‟ participation 
in initiating, making, implementing, monitoring and evaluating decisions and plans that affect them 
by transferring power, authority and resources from central to local government and lower levels, 
and ensuring that all levels have adequate capacities and motivations to promote genuine 
participation.‖ (MINALOC, 2013b: 8, emphasis in the original), its fourth objective introduces the 
concept of joint planning between central and local authorities with delivery left to local levels – ―To 
enhance effectiveness and efficiency in the planning, monitoring, and delivery of services by 
promoting joint development planning between central and local governments and ensuring that 
service delivery responsibilities and corresponding public expenditure are undertaken at the lowest 
levels possible.” (MINALOC, 2013b: 8-9, emphasis in original).   
 
In addition to these shifts in emphasis, the revised policy also includes three new objectives as 
follows: to consolidate national unity and identity; to build and consolidate volunteerism, community 
work and self-reliance; and to fast-track and translate the regional integration agenda.  Thus, overall, 
while retaining some commitment to substantive participation, the revised policy reflects an 
increased emphasis on local economic growth, fiscal autonomy, and participation as cost-sharing via 
volunteerism, communal labour and increased local taxation.   
 
Another key policy document in relation to participation within decentralised entities is the 
government‘s Community Development Policy first elaborated in 2001 and revised in 2008.  Like the 
revised Decentralisation Policy, this policy is also somewhat ambiguous and confusing in terms of 
community links to and engagement with decentralised structures.  While on the one hand, it 
emphasises a cost-sharing conception of participation - speaking often about self-reliance and self-
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development in the apparent absence of the state, on the other it invokes a more substantive 
conception – talking of public participation in policy decision-making.  For example, the revised 
policy sets out two somewhat contradictory aims within the same paragraph.  Noting that the overall 
aim of the 2001 policy was to ―ensure the effective and sustainable participation of the community in 
its own development, in order to achieve poverty reduction and self-reliance based on the 
sustainable exploitation of available resources.” – i.e. participation through cost-sharing, the revised 
policy goes on to set out its overall aim as being ―to foster public participation in policy and decision 
making processes in a bid to turn around the centralistic development approach that had previously 
characterised the country” – substantive participation (RoR, 2008: 4).  While this might indicate a 
shift towards a more substantive concept of participation and community development over the 
seven year period between the original and revised policies, this is contradicted by the apparent 
reversal to a cost-sharing / self-reliance discourse two pages later. 
 
In this policy, the GoR envisages a community that is organised, self motivated, 
hardworking, forward-looking, and has the ability to exploit local potential within 
innovations geared toward sustainable development”  
(RoR, 2008: 6, emphasis in original) 
 
Further on, the Community Development Policy defines what is understood by ‗Community 
Participation‘ which is identified as the first guiding principle of the policy. ―Local communities hold 
the key to sustainable development. They have the capacity to take charge of their own development 
and hence their effective participation is indispensible.  Participation should be mobilised and 
concentrated at the lowest operational - Umudugudu level.” (RoR, 2008: 11).  Participation as cost-
sharing rather than a more substantive, political form of participation appears to be what is in mind.  
This is confirmed as the policy progresses with the reminder, on page 16, that ―The Community 
Development Policy is based on the constitutional principles where the citizen has an obligation to 
use his labour to contribute to the prosperity of the country (Article 47 of the revised constitution of 
the Republic of Rwanda of 4
th
 June 2003).‖ (RoR, 2008: 16).   
 
Taken together therefore, these somewhat subtle and at times ambiguous shifts in policy over time 
appear to suggest an increased emphasis on participation as cost-sharing - through increased 
communal labour (now enshrined within Article 47 of the revised Constitution) and increased local 
taxation aimed at achieving local fiscal autonomy.  In addition, a greater influence of central 
authorities in planning is apparent within the new climate of ‗fast-track‘ economic development and 
there is a reduced emphasis on substantive forms of participation involving local planning and 
decision-making.  The following section goes on to examine the structures through which this is 
achieved.   
 
 
3.2.3  Structures and roles 
 
There are currently four main levels of decentralised authority, with an additional lower level of 10 
households in certain umudugudu.  These levels and their principal structures and functions are 
depicted in Figure 3.2.3 below.  The structures in red indicate where opportunities for substantive 
participation (as well as cost-sharing) exist.  Arrowed lines indicate accountability pathways and 
thick arrowed lines indicate accountability through imihigo / performance contracts.   
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While Figure 3.2.3 above depicts the principle structures as set out in the relevant legislation, 
interviews reveal that each level comprises a complex additional array of sub-structures and 
committees.   
 
At district level, there are between 40 and 50 staff.  While some report to the district Mayor, each 
district also includes staff reporting directly to central level (including a Good Governance officer 
and a DG for Immigration) as well as staff contracted by international donor agencies.  As one 
international commentator notes, this leads to some confusion in relation to roles and the distribution 
of power and authority. 
 
The distribution of power is quite problematic here.  The relations between the Mayor and 
the Executive Secretary are unclear... You also have the representative of Good Governance 
which comes from the RGB.  So he is not a member of the council or district.  He is just 
brought in from the RGB or MINALOC.  You have the representative of the DG Immigration 
who comes from the central level. And those people do not respond to the district authorities.  
They respond to the central level.  So this kind of relationship between members, it is 
problematic.  We have had many cases reported of problems with actions, for instance 
registration of NGOs or implementation of activities, [which have been] decided and 
approved within the JADF with the approval of the Mayor.  So with the approval of the 
Mayor you should have the green light. But then it comes to the representative of DG 
Immigration and he blocks it. 
     (Representative of international agency, Kigali) 
 
District councils, which meet every three months, are made up of between 30 and 40 members who 
are non-salaried.  As outlined in Section 3.3.3, these are elected indirectly (by sector councillors) 
although many interviewees note that senior post-holders (mayors and vice-mayors – salaried 
positions), though passing through the indirect electoral process, are nonetheless political appointees.  
While district meetings are technically public (although they can be closed if councillors request 
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this)
23
, notice of meetings is not provided and the public never attends
24
.  While citizens have a right 
to consult the minutes of council meetings filed in district headquarters, the council also has 
“absolute powers to decide that the debates of the meeting be maintained as a secret until it 
considers it unnecessary”25.  There is no legal provision for making the district budget, which is 
prepared by the Mayor and Vice-Mayors and approved by the council
26
, public.  The district council 
includes a myriad of commissions which draw in, as required, additional people.  There is a high 
turnover of both senior elected and appointed officials.  During the last electoral term (2006-2011), 
24 of the 30 district Mayors ‗resigned‘, with approximately half of these being ‗asked‘ to leave27.   
 
At sector level, staff include an Executive Secretary, a Civil Status Officer
28
, an Economic Affairs 
Officer, a Social Affairs Officer, and an Agricultural Advisor.  Sector councils in the sites visited 
have between 22 and 24 non-salaried members.  As with the district council, these are elected 
indirectly.  Sectors also have mediation committees (for dispute resolution), development 
committees and security committees.  Members of these are selected by the Executive Secretary and 
council.  The balance of power within the sector lies with the Executive Secretary.  Many council 
members – as public sector employees (local school principals, teachers, health centre managers etc.) 
– are de facto employees of the Executive Secretary who has the power to promote or fire them.  
Therefore, they remain subordinate to him
29
. 
 
At cell level, staff include the Executive Secretary, a Development Officer, Health workers and, 
recently introduced in some cells, an Agricultural Advisor.  Consultative committees in the sites 
visited have between 12 and 19 members.  Although these are directly elected at village level, 
officials interviewed note that they include representatives of different interest groups including 
teachers (nursery, primary and secondary), health workers, business men, youth, disabled and 
women.  There are also mediation committees, development committees and security committees at 
cell level. 
 
Generally speaking, districts have primarily coordinating and financial functions; sectors coordinate, 
manage and execute development and service delivery; and cells mobilise and ‗sensitise‘ the local 
population.  Development activities are carried out at the lowest, village or umudugudu level.  
According to MINALOC (2007: 9), the primary functions at each level are as follows: ―Districts are 
charged with local economic development and planning and coordinating the delivery of public 
services. The Sector is the focal point for delivering services to the population. It is also charged 
with coordinating community participatory development, as well as collecting data and information. 
The Cell is responsible for needs assessment and prioritisation, and mobilising community action. 
Finally, the Umudugudu is charged with building cooperation, collaboration and solidarity among 
                                                 
23
 Article 36, GoR, 2006 
24
 Interviews national NGOs and international agencies, Kigali, 11/02/2013; 14/02/2013; 05/03/2013. 
25
 Article 44, GoR, 2006 
26
 Article 135, GoR, 2006 
27
 Interview state representatives, Kigali, 12/02/2013 and 13/02/2013. 
28
 ―Etat Civile‖ – The Etat Civile is second in command to the Executive Secretary and is responsible for ‗regularising‘ 
marriages throughout the Sector.   
29
 This problem was highlighted in interview by a number of council members.  
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members of the community.” It should be noted that, while the relevant policies speak of village level 
planning and substantive forms of participation, the Presidential Order – the one official document 
detailing the roles and functions of the sector, cell and village respectively – makes no reference to 
such participation, emphasising instead functions of mobilisation and sensitisation at village level 
(RoR, 2006a - see Appendix III for the relevant excerpts). 
 
The principal roles of the councils/committees at all levels are detailed in the Decentralisation 
Policy
30
.  In an effort to ascertain councillor and officials‘ own understandings of their roles in 
practice, they were asked in interview to explain their principal roles together with the challenges 
they face in exercising these.  These principal roles, as outlined in the Decentralisation Policy and by 
interviewees across the six sites, together with the principal challenges they identify, are set out in 
Table 3.2.3 below.  The roles highlighted in grey indicate commonalities between those set out in the 
relevant policy and those identified by councillors and officials. 
 
Table 3.2.3  Principle roles of councils at different levels of administration 
 
Level Role (RoR, 2001a: 13, 16) Role (interviews) Challenges (interviews) 
District - Discussion and approval of 
DDPs and budgets 
- Enact district by-laws 
- Mobilise district to participate 
in devt activities 
- Oversee & monitor the work 
of the District Exec Cte, 
ensuring its accountability 
- Security 
- Development planning and 
monitoring 
- Financial monitoring 
- Population mindset 
- Resources 
- Financial responsibility 
Sector - Approval of sector plans & 
programmes, assuring follow-
up on implementation 
- Approving the annual budget 
- Analysing & approving lower 
level decisions 
- Controlling Sector Exec Ctes‘ 
activities & functioning 
- Analysing problems and 
proposing solutions 
- Disciplining incompetent 
council members (decisions to 
replace these are taken by 
higher authorities)  
- Safeguarding sector security 
- Security 
- Development planning and 
coordinating 
 
 
 
 
 
- Population Mindset 
 
Cell - Daily administration 
- Implementation of council 
decisions 
- Guiding cell pop in devmt 
activities 
- Identifying and prioritising 
needs 
- Mobilisation of pop, local 
partners and local resources for 
devt 
- Preparation & submission to 
cell council plans for the cell 
- Submission to the sector 
- Security 
- Resolution of local problems / 
conflicts 
- Coordination of development 
activities – mobilisation of 
population / umuganda 
- Sensitisation of population 
- Population mindset 
- Poor office accommodation 
- Lack of office materials 
- Lack of transport 
                                                 
30
 As noted above, the Presidential decree (RoR, 2006a) also details the role and function of sector, cell and village 
committees.  
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council the needs of the cell 
that bypass its competencies 
- M&E of cell devmt activities 
 
The comparison of roles as set out in the Decentralisation Policy and those as outlined by 
interviewees reveal a number of interesting issues.  First, a key role identified at all levels (and often 
the first cited in interview) is security.  While the final role outlined in the Decentralisation Policy at 
sector level is “safeguarding sector security”, there is no other mention of security as a role for 
councils or officials within this Policy.  It is clear that this is a top priority at all levels however.  
Security committees exist at all levels and cell leaders organise nightly patrols of community 
policing.  Indeed, one of the main obstacles identified in interviews to women‘s leadership at village 
and cell level is their unsuitability for security roles.  Cell and sector leaders submit weekly reports to 
their authorities (sector and district respectively) on the local security situation and records are 
maintained on all ‗strangers‘ arriving into local areas who require official authorisation before being 
allowed to settle.   
 
Second, although local prioritisation and planning is written into the Policy, in reality any local 
planning appears to take place at sector and district level.  At sector level, one Executive Secretary 
describes his role and that of his council as ―top-down decision implementation‖ going on to 
succinctly explain how this works, ―We in the Sector coordinate the Cell, and the Cell coordinates 
the village.  The village is the organ of mobilisation‖.  Both the district Mayor and Executive 
Secretary interviewed describe their principle role as being “the implementation of national policies 
and district resolutions”.  Implementation of the resultant planned activities and programmes then 
takes place at cell and village level where coordination, mobilisation and sensitisation are the roles 
consistently mentioned.   
 
Third, this means that participation at the most local levels is viewed principally as implementation.  
Therefore, the opportunities for substantive participation, as set out in Figure 3.2.3 above are, in 
reality, quite limited.  . 
 
Finally, the challenges highlighted by interviewees are also quite revealing in that they reinforce 
indications of quite a top-down, autocratic form of governance where top-down pressures to ‗fast-
track‘ development are meeting with some resistance – or, in the commonly repeated phrase, ―lack of 
understanding‖ – from citizens.  At all levels, the principal challenge highlighted by interviewees in 
exercising their roles is the ―mindset‖ or ―mentality‖ of the population.  This is explained more fully 
in the following interview excerpts. 
 
When we are in development we need to change the peoples‟ mentalities... there is a 
population who thinks that everything should be carried out by the state.  But they also have 
an important role which they have started to realise, which they did not know before.  And so 
the process is to change their mentality to understand that they also can work, that they can 
also participate - there is a challenge within it of sensitisation. 
       (District Vice-Mayor, Site D) 
 
  
The first job we have is to change the comportment and the mentality of the population. To do 
this is a process.  
Question: how do you change this mentality?   
We do lots of meetings with the population.  Through these meetings we tell the population 
what [how] we wish things to be.  We also do home visits to verify that what we have said is 
being put into practice.  We follow what the population does. 
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      (Sector Executive Secretary, Site D) 
 
 
Reform is very new. So that the population feels a little uneasy.  There are resistances. When 
there is change there is resistance. And we are in a country that is advancing very fast. Life 
before is not like life now. But with education, with decentralisation, the majority finish by 
being educated and advancing with the programme which must be implemented. 
      (Sector Executive Secretary, Site B) 
 
 
To deal with the population is not an easy thing.  It is obvious that there might be some 
challenges. There are some that have this mindset that is not easy to change.  
Question: What is the mindset that is not easy to change?   
People who are too old, an old man, or those who have never been to school. They are the 
ones that we have to keep telling them to make so much effort to make change.  We are in a 
country that is in a hurry.  So there is an urgency in implementing government programmes 
and it can take an old man more time to understand and get the point. 
        (Cell Executive Secretary, Site C) 
 
 
The pressures on local leaders to ‗fast-track‘ reforms and implement programmes and activities are 
clearly immense.  The ambitious commitments and targets within their imihigos add to this pressure.  
Sector leaders interviewed note that they need to achieve a score of 80% or more to retain their posts.  
Otherwise, they are fired.  Achievement of these imihigo targets depends on broad-based citizen 
participation – both financially and through their labour.  Resistance to this understandably poses a 
problem for leaders whose livelihoods depend on meeting these targets.  However, officials‘ 
understandings of this resistance and their strategies for addressing it are worryingly redolent of the 
second prejudice identified by Uvin in pre-1994 Rwanda – the condescending, paternalistic, 
humiliating attitude of the evolués toward their more traditional, less educated, rural co-citizens.  
 
Taken together, the overall analysis of relevant texts in this section, together with the findings from 
interviews with local officials regarding their roles and the challenges they face reveal a number of 
important shifts in the aim and trajectory of decentralisation over time.  First, from the outset, 
opportunities for substantive participation at district level remain limited compared to other 
countries
31
.  Accountability, through imihigos and regular reporting is upward, district council 
debates can be kept secret and the district budget is not made publically available.  Second, a shift 
from more substantive forms of participation to participation as cost-sharing over time is apparent 
from subtle changes within the revised Decentralisation and Community Development Policies.  This 
is acknowledged by senior state officials involved in the process from the beginning
32
 and is 
reflective of the broader government strategy which, in the mid 2000s, shifted somewhat from 
peacebuilding through reconciliation and dialogue to peacebuilding through rapid growth and 
modernisation, efficient service delivery and building a strong middle class
33
.  While a laudable 
strategy in itself, this has increased pressure on local authorities to achieve the ‗fast-track‘ reforms 
                                                 
31
 See for example the Burundi case (Gaynor, 2011) where legislation dictates that district (commune) council decisions 
and budgets be made public and posted outside district offices.  
32
 Interviews state representatives, Kigali, 12/02/2013 and 13/02/2013. 
33
 Interviews state representatives and international agencies, Kigali, 12/02/2013; 13/02/2013; 15/02/2013; 05/03/2013, 
also see Murenzi and Hughes (2006). 
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required for the strategy to succeed.  This in turn has increased pressures on local populations to 
“change their mindsets” and reduce their resistance, providing the financial and physical 
contributions required by local authorities in the exercise of their functions.   
 
Given the problematic legacy of decentralisation in Rwanda, these developments and shifts over time 
raise obvious questions about, at best, parallels with, and, at worst, a possible return to the dangerous 
and damaging practices of structural violence of the past.  That said, it is also important to realise 
that the developmental focus and attention to service delivery at local levels (albeit heavily 
dependent on a citizens‘ own resources) represents a welcome rupture from the predatory activities 
of previous regimes.  Bearing in mind the legacy of previous decentralisation experiments, a key 
question remains in relation to citizens‘ own views and perceptions of the new decentralisation 
programme and its proponents.  This is the subject of the next section.  
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3.3  Decentralisation in practice 
 
This section draws further from field research to examine both the effectiveness and responsiveness 
of decentralised structures and authorities in the eyes of citizens and the opportunities for different 
forms of participation in these.  The section begins with a brief profile of the districts visited for the 
field research.  It then moves on to examine the effectiveness and responsiveness of local structures 
employing two different methods of analysis.  The third, fourth and fifth sub-sections examine the 
efficacy of the mechanisms of procedural, substantive and cost-sharing participation respectively.  
The final sub-section brings the data together to discuss the overall findings in the context of 
peacebuilding.   
 
 
3.3.1  Brief background to the five districts  
 
Table 3.3.1 below draws from EICV and DDP data to present a brief profile of the five districts 
visited for this research.  As noted in Section 2, efforts were made to select sites which provided for 
geographic and socio-economic diversity.  While it would also have been desirable to select on the 
basis of ethnic diversity, this was not possible as ethnicity can no longer be openly discussed in 
Rwanda.  Two of the districts are in the Northern province and three are in the Southern province.  
They are all predominantly rural districts.  As the table indicates, one of the districts – Nyaruguru in 
the south – is currently ranked as the poorest in the country and has the highest proportion of 
households attempting to live off less than a third of a hectare of land.  Rulindo district in the north 
lies in the top third most wealthy districts and correspondingly, of the sample here, has the lowest 
proportion of households attempting to live off less than a third of a hectare. 
 
 
Table 3.3.1: Brief Profile of five districts visited for field research 
 
Site District Population % female 
/ male  
Poverty 
ranking 
% 
population 
defined as 
poor 
% of 
cultivating 
households 
with < 1/3 
ha. 
A Gakenke 345,000 53 / 47 7
th
 57% 43% 
E & F Gisagara 267,161 54 / 46 6
th
 61% 46% 
C Nyamagabe 330,000 53 / 47 1
st
 73% 58% 
D Nyaruguru 304,000 53 / 47 4
th
 62% 52% 
B Rulindo 294,000 53 / 47 21
st
 43% 38% 
 
Sources:  EICV3s Gakenke, Nyamagabe, Nyaruguru, Rulindo (NISRn.d.); DDP Gisagara 
 
 
 
3.3.2  Effectiveness and responsiveness of local structures 
 
One of the key indicators of success within decentralisation is the effectiveness and responsiveness 
of local authorities in addressing local priorities and needs.  The effectiveness and responsiveness of 
local structures in Rwanda‘s process is analysed two ways within this section.  First, drawing on the 
approach employed by Manor and Crook (1998) in their seminal study on decentralisation across 
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four countries, local community priorities – explored in individual interviews – are compared with 
those outlined by local officials within interviews.  Second, local communities‘ use of local 
structures in both resolving local conflicts and addressing problems with services is examined.   
 
 
Development priorities compared 
 
According to both policy and local officials interviewed, local priorities and issues are identified 
locally by citizens within village meetings.  These are then fed upward through cell, sector and 
district planning processes and form the basis of both the DDPs and prioritised activities at more 
local levels.  Following this process, we could expect to see a high degree of congruence between 
priorities identified by citizens and local authorities.  Across the six sites, individual citizens were 
asked to define what it is that is important to be content in life (―se sentir bien dans la vie‖).  A 
second question aimed at eliciting the same information inversely explored what the causes of 
absolute misery are (―quelqu‟un qui est vraiment dans la misère, qu‟est qu‟il fait qu‟il/elle est comme 
ça?‖).  Across the same sites, officials at district, sector and cell levels were asked what the main 
prioirities for communities within their jurisdictions are.  The resultant coded and collated data is 
synopsised in Table 3.3.2 below.  The issues raised are ranked in order of importance for each 
category according to the frequency with which they were raised. 
 
Table 3.3.2 : Community and authorities’ priorities compared 
 
Priority Citizens Cell leaders Sector leaders District 
leaders 
No domestic GBV 1 4 3 - 
Food security / access to land 2 4 (consolidatn) 1 (consolidatn) 1 (consolidatn) 
Health services 3 1 (mutuelle) 2 (mutuelle) - 
Children in school 4 - 1 - 
Decent clothing 5 - - - 
To have an income 6 - - - 
Security / peace 7 - - 3 
     
Family planning - 2 - - 
Savings and credit facilities - 3 1 1 
Building a cell office - 4 - - 
Hygiene & sanitation -  3  
Roads - - - 1 
ICT and computer literacy - - - 2 
Electricity - - - 3 
 
For individual citizens, among women and men alike, by far the most important priority is the 
elimination of conflict and domestic violence at home.  32% of interviewees overall (26% male; 38% 
female) cited this as their single most important issue with a further 16% combining it with other 
issues - food security and health (7% - 11% male; 3% female), food security and good clothes (7% - 
4% male; 9% female), and money/a job (2% - all female).  Food security emerges as another 
particular preoccupation of women (37%) while access to land and/or money/a job is a particular 
preoccupation of men (38%).  Health is a preoccupation among women and men with women 
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focusing on having access to services and men focusing more on being able to pay their mutuelle
34
.  
Other issues mentioned are having clean children in school (particularly predominant among women 
– 25%) and being able to clothe children and the family properly.  Interestingly, the issue of security, 
although, as we have seen, of high importance for authorities, appears very low in priority for 
citizens interviewed with just 3% (4% male; 3% female) citing it as important.   
 
These findings are mirrored in the corollary question of ―what causes misfortune / misery?‖ where, 
in order of importance, conflict at home; food security and ill health; lack of land; having to work as 
a labourer for others; and no money/no job are cited as the principle causes.  Reflecting the findings 
above, the most common response (34% - 30% male; 38% female) is conflict at home.  This is 
followed by the lack of food security and ill health (with many noting this happens when you cannot 
pay your mutuelle and therefore are turned away at the health clinic) (17% - 15% male; 19% female).  
15% (15% male; 16% female) cite a lack of land while 14% (22% male; 6% female) cite having to 
work as a labourer for others as main causes of misery.  Allied to these issues, a further 7% (4% 
male; 9% female) cite having no money and no job.   
 
From these findings it is apparent that the most important priority for men and women alike is the 
elimination of domestic conflict and violence.  Questioned as to why such conflicts occur, many 
interviewees spoke of ―a poor understanding” between couples where husbands remain resistant to 
changing gender relations, as well as problems of spouses – mostly men – sleeping with and/or 
moving in with other women.  70% of interviewees (59% male; 78% female) noted that such 
practices are a major source of conflict as the husband spends his money on his new partner and may 
also take land and property from his wife.  One FG participant outlines the many causes of conflict at 
home: 
 
First there is poverty - the husband uses the [household] money for beer.  Then there is 
polygamy - you might find all the things that you gain [earn] in the family the husband will 
take to the other woman.  There is a poor understanding - you may find that that the family 
needs training and advice on understanding.  It may be that they are not using the family 
planning so, when they find themselves with so many children that they cannot take care of, 
that causes problems.  When the husband is always drinking, that causes problems.   
      (Participant female FG, Site A) 
 
It should be noted that, for local authorities, domestic conflict and violence is cited as a (albeit lower) 
priority because of its effects on other developmental outcomes.  A Sector Executive Secretary 
explains: 
 
I forgot to mention that one of our priorities is disputes within household.  Such disputes are 
one of our priorities. We educate the population to avoid such types of disputes. This type of 
behaviour is not good because it can impact on all our priorities which we need to implement 
at family level. With disputes we can have dropouts at school.  With disputes we can have 
children on the streets. With disputes poverty enters the households... 
      (Sector Executive Secretary, Site D) 
 
 
                                                 
34
 The ‗mutuelle‟ [Mutuelle de Santé] is an annual health insurance payment which must be paid for all individuals in 
order to be able to access public health services.  Annual payments range from FrRw 3,000 to 7,000 per individual, with 
rates linked to individual‘s ubudehe categorisation. 
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Taken together, the collated data on citizen and local authority priorities in Table 3.3.2 reveal some 
interesting trends.  First, they show that cell and sector leaders appear more in tune with 
communities‘ prioirities than district leaders.  There are three commonalities with community 
priorities among cell leaders; four among sector leaders ; and just two among district leaders.  
Second, local authorities at cell and sector level are somewhat in agreement with local communities 
on communities‘ top priorities – the elimination of domestic conflict / violence; food security 
(although authorities frame this as “land consolidation”35 and do not address the access issue); and 
access to health services (authorities frame this securing mutuelle payments
36
).  Third, authorities 
cite seven more priorities which are not cited by citizens.  The most important one of these for 
authorities is the provision of savings and credit facilities – this being of principle importance for 
sector and district level authorities.  This appears somewhat perplexing given the fact that 
communities are more preoccupied with securing an income, something not seen as a priority by 
authorities.  With little or no income, it is difficult to know what communities will save.  The 
attraction of credit facilities to authorities may in part be explained by the finding – reported later – 
that a number of citizens report having been urged to take out a loan in order to pay for their mutuelle 
this year.  There is some divergence among authorities on priorities not cited by communities 
thereafter with cell authorities citing family planning and the building of cell offices as community 
priorities, sector authorities citing health and sanitation, and district officials echoing more national 
priorities of roads, ICT literacy and electricity.   
 
Overall, the findings indicate a degree of congruency between community and local authority 
priorities although district level authorities appear more out of tune with community needs than cell 
and sector level authorities.  Citizens‘ three top priorities of domestic conflict / violence, food 
security, and health are all reflected in the priorities of cell and sector leaders although differences 
exist in how these issues are framed, and thus, in the solutions proposed.  For example, while 
domestic conflicts arising from inter alia acute income poverty, stress and complicated power 
relations, constitute a key issue for citizens, it is doubtful that the solutions proposed by officials – 
‗regularisation‘ of marriages37 and instructing couples not to fight – will address the complex 
relational issues underlying this problem.  The three top priorities of district officials however are 
more reflective of national economic development priorities and are of little concern to citizens.  
These findings overall indicate some level of effectiveness and responsiveness of cell and sector 
authorities, but practically none at district level where the final planning and budgetary decisions are 
made.   
 
 
Citizens’ use of local structures 
 
Another way of assessing the effectiveness of local structures – most notably with regard to their 
legitimacy in the eyes of citizens – is to examine citizens‘ knowledge of their role together with 
citizens‘ use of these structures in this regard. 
 
                                                 
35
 “Land consolidation” is a government programme aimed at increasing agricultural output.  It involves individual 
farmers pooling or ‗consolidating‘ their land and growing a common subsidised crop (for example coffee) as 
advised/instructed by local authorities. 
36
 Mutuelle payment targets form part of local authorities‘ imihigos. 
37
 The principle function of the sector Etat Civile officer is to ‗regularise‘ or legalise common law marriages.  Targets of 
100% regularisation are included the imihigos of sectors visited. 
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Interviewees were asked what the principle role of village level authorities is.  The findings are 
collated in Figure 3.3.2a below.   
 
 
Figure 3.3.2a: Citizens’ views on the role of village level authorities 
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Interviewees – with some significant gender differences – cited three main roles.  36% of 
interviewees (52% male; 22% female) cited their principle role as being to direct and instruct the 
population by organising Umuganda, transferring orders from the top authorities, and reporting 
upwards to these.  34% of interviewees (22% male; 44% female) cited their principle role as being 
local conflict resolution and solving local problems. A further 15% (11% male; 19% female) cited 
both of these roles while the remaining 15% (equal male and female) cited local security as being 
their principle role.  Thus, the role of local authorities is perceived to be three-fold – to direct the 
community in carrying out orders from higher level authorities (principally male participants); to 
resolve local conflicts and disputes ( principally female participants); and to assure local security 
(male and female participants). 
 
Interestingly, asked about the role of district level authorities, 58% of interviewees (48% male; 66% 
female) professed to not knowing, with a number noting they had never been to the district centre nor 
seen any district authority so therefore could not know.   22% of interviewees (30% male; 16% 
female) suggested that they are there to ‗solve problems‘ which are not solved at village or cell level; 
10% (7% male; 13% female) to carry out local development; 8.5% (15% male; 3% female) to report 
to higher authorities; and 2% (all female) for local security.  These findings are collated in Figure 
3.3.2b below. 
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Figure 3.3.2b: Citizens’ views on the role of district level authorities 
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Interviewees were also asked if they knew anything about their district budget.  97% (equal male and 
female) responded that no, they have never heard of this, while 2% (all male) claim to have heard it 
mentioned in meetings.  1% (all female) declined to respond.  These findings suggest a low level of 
knowledge of the role of district authorities – particularly among women, thereby suggesting a poor 
level of representation (see following section).    
 
Although 58% of interviewees were unsure of the role of district authorities, all interviewees had 
views on the role of their local, village level authorities as reflected above.  Interviewees were asked, 
given these roles, how often they have gone to their local authorities with an issue to be resolved.  
The findings are summarised in Figure 3.3.2c below: 
 
 
Figure 3.3.2c: Citizens’ use of local authorities 
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Overall 58% (63% male; 53% female) of interviewees have never approached their local authorities 
with an issue.  This percentage is particularly high in both Site A (Gakenke district (70%)) and in 
Site E (Kansi sector of Gisagara district (73%)).  The gender difference in this overall finding is 
somewhat consistent with the finding reported above where more women than men see their role in 
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local conflict resolution, while more men than women see their role as transferring orders from and 
reporting to higher level authorities.  Of those that have consulted their local authorities, 7% (all 
women) have sought assistance in resolving domestic disputes/violence; 3% (all women) have gone 
to seek financial assistance as their family were starving; and 2% (all women) have gone to report 
theft from their homes.  A further 14% (15% male; 13% female) have brought land dispute issues for 
resolution to local authorities; 10% (15% male; 6% female) have gone to seek assistance in resolving 
disputes with neighbours while 7% (7% male; 6% female) have gone to get official papers (to the 
Cell leader).   
 
 
Interviewees and FG participants were also asked how, within their communities, they resolved a) 
problems with local services and b) local conflicts / disputes with neighbours and/or spouses.  The 
findings from these questions are summarised in Figures 3.3.2d and 3.3.2e below. 
 
Figure 3.3.2d: How problems with services are addressed 
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In relation to services, 46% (48% male; 44% female) noted that they abandon the service or find an 
alternative while a further 5% (all women) said they did not know what to do when services broke 
down.  44% (equal male and female) said that they go to the local village leader who organises an 
Umuganda to fix the service, while 5% (7% male; 3% female) said that they contact the service 
provider directly themselves.  These findings illustrate that over half of all interviewees do not 
associate local authorities with service provision.  This is particularly prevalent in Site D (Nyaruguru 
district) where all interviewees reported that they abandon the service and in Site F (Kigembe sector 
in Gisagara district) where 87% of interviewees abandon the service.  In contrast, in both Sites A and 
B (Gakenke and Rulindo districts in the North), 80% of interviewees claimed to consult their local 
authorities in cases of breakdown.   
 
These overall findings are somewhat mirrored in the findings in relation to how local conflicts are 
resolved as depicted in Figure 3.3.2e below.   
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Figure 3.3.2e: How conflicts are resolved 
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64% of interviewees overall (63% male; 65% female) attempt to resolve local disputes themselves, 
between families and/or neighbours without involving the local authorities.  32% (30% male; 34% 
female) involve the local chief while a further 4% (all male) consult another authority either from the 
church or from a local NGO.  Comparing across research sites, interviewees in Sites A and B 
(Gakenke and Rulindo districts in the North) and Site F (Gisagara (Kigembe sector) in the South), 
make little use of their local authorities (10%, 20% and 13% respectively) while in Site D 
(Nyaruguru) 60% of interviewees consult with him/her. 
 
Overall these findings indicate a relatively low level of active consultation with local authorities in 
relation to two of their core areas of work despite citizens‘ awareness of these roles.  On the one 
hand this might indicate that, contrary to suggestions of a passive citizenry, citizens are capable of 
resolving issues and getting on with their lives themselves.  On the other, it may also be indicative of 
a strong distrust of local authorities and institutions – something both Desrosier and Thomson (2011) 
and the IRDP (2011b: 83-84) assert is the case.  The findings also show that citizens associate local 
authorities, more strongly than anything else, with organising umuganda communal labour and 
transferring the orders and directives of higher authorities downward to citizens.  This reflects the 
more traditional concept of leadership from the pre-1994 era rather than the more accountable, 
responsive one promoted within official rhetoric.  At district level, the findings are unequivocal in 
pointing toward a very low level of awareness of role and work of district level authorities and 
practically no awareness of budgetary priorities or plans.  While the findings suggest some level of 
effectiveness and responsiveness among cell and sector level authorities therefore, this is 
dramatically weaker at district level.  The overall findings in this section raise questions around 
downward accountability and representation.  These are explored in the following section.   
  
 
3.3.3 Procedural participation 
 
In a system of representative democracy, citizen participation is firstly assured through the electoral 
system.  Following the administrative reforms introduced in Rwanda‘s decentralisation process in 
2006, the first local elections were held throughout the country.  Following completion of the first 
five year term, a second round of elections was held in 2011.  Combining a complex mix of direct 
and indirect suffrage, these elections afford citizens the opportunity to direct elect members of 
village and cell committees.  This is done in a public manner, by lining up (standing) behind the 
41 | P a g e  
 
candidate of your choice.  Members of sector and district level councils are then elected by members 
of cell and sector committees themselves with additional members (reserved seats) being nominated 
by special interest groups including (but not restricted to
38
) an interest group for women (the 
National Committee for Women); an interest group for the disabled (the National Council for People 
with Disability); and an interest group for youth. 
 
Drawing on his observations of and research on the conduct of the 2006 elections in a local village, 
Ingelaere (2011, 71-73) highlights a number of problems in this election including a ‗sensitisation‘ 
meeting organised by local ruling party representatives with local opinion formers (teachers and 
local business men)  where candidates for the local cell committee were ‗proposed‘.  According to 
Ingelaere, all of these candidates were ruling party members who had been screened by soldiers 
beforehand.  These candidates were then nominated at the elections and, with soldiers circulating 
nearby to ‗provide security‘, all but one was elected.  These restrictions notwithstanding, it is 
noteworthy that the remaining position was won by a candidate favoured by a group of residents 
while, in a neighbouring cell, citizens refused to continue with the elections when soldiers intervened 
to insist the ruling party representative had won even though he had received less votes than another 
non-ruling party candidate (Ingelaere, 2011: 76 – Note 7).  Thus, Ingelaere‘s account reveals 
political coercion but also local resistance to this. 
 
In contrast to this account, there was some consensus from interviewees for this research that the 
2011 local elections, held from February to April, were relatively free and fair, with little overt 
coercion involved.  With ―mobilisation of the population‖ constituting one of local officials‘ imihigo 
targets however
39
, participation in elections is more or less mandatory.  An election monitor from the 
RCSP interviewed reported that the only problem observers could report was the fact that some 
people – notably women – were either late in arriving or did not turn up at all, ―Some women were 
not coming.  Some were still at home.  By the time it is voting time they have still not come. And it 
should start on time.”.  All citizens interviewed for this research reported that they had voted.   
Asked why, they either responded that it is mandatory or that it is their ―civic duty‖.   
 
While the findings from this research reveal little evidence of political interference in the direct 
selection of candidates, they do reveal evidence of indirect influence in that ‗sensitisation‘ sessions 
were organised some days in advance by local authorities to inform citizens of the characteristics that 
they should seek in candidates (a Rwandan citizen who is honest - with any prison record not 
exceeding 6 months
40
, fair, literate, experienced in leadership and a problem solver).  3% of 
individual interviewees (all women) reported that suitable candidates were pointed out in advance by 
local authorities during these meetings.  This ‗sensitisation‘ notwithstanding, most interviewees were 
content that they had the freedom to choose their own choice among the candidates proposed.  As a 
participant on one of the FGs noted 
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 There is some confusion among interviewees regarding how many such special interest groups can nominate members.  
Some restrict it to the three cited here while others also include business interest groups, academic interest groups, 
economic sectoral interest groups, representatives of different local services (in health, education, etc.)  and others. 
39
 Interviews local officials, Sites, A, B, C, D and E.  A number of local officials (and some citizens) noted that a 100% 
electoral turnout is an indicator of ―good governance‖. 
40
 This effectively precludes many targeted opposition figures who, commentators argue, have been jailed on sometimes 
quite spurious grounds (see Reyntjens, 2004, 2010; Straus, 2006). 
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Before, I would go [line up] behind someone who is my relative. Or maybe it was someone 
who will buy me a drink in the bar. [Today] Most people have changed their mindset and you 
can leave your relative and go and stand behind someone who will develop you.   
        (Participant female FG, Site B) 
 
 
While the direct election process thus appears relatively free and fair (although a number of 
interviewees note that the lack of a secret ballot makes it somewhat problematic), the process 
becomes far more complicated as one moves up the scale to sector and district levels.  Here 
candidates are elected by cell and sector committee members themselves, with an unspecified 
number
41
 of reserved seats provided for nominees
42
 from special interest groups.  There was some 
consensus among interviewees that the important and influential positions of district Mayor and, to a 
lesser degree, Vice-Mayor, while, in theory emerging from this indirect electoral process, constitute 
in reality strategic political appointments.  How precisely this happens is unclear, but one 
commentator in Kigali outlines the broad contours... 
 
...in reality, there is a committee in Kigali who decides who becomes Mayor. So if you want 
to run as Mayor, forget it, you need to have the contacts here [in Kigali]. It is always you 
have the official way, and then how it is actually done. And that is always a big difference in 
Rwanda. The way it is actually done – how I understand it – is you have a committee with 
people from the ruling party, the army, the police etc. - those high ranking guys.  And you 
need to have good contacts.  Then they suggest you.  Then the elections are a formal way, but 
it is clear who can be Mayor and who cannot. 
     (Representative of international agency, Kigali) 
 
Thus, it would appear that the high ranking positions, at district level at least, involve some level of 
political interference / influence, thereby undermining, to some degree, the level of citizen 
participation at this level.   
 
Of course representative democracy also only works if two additional conditions are met – that 
elected representatives enjoy some degree of influence and control over policy, and that, in 
exercising this influence, they represent and remain accountable to their citizens.  The findings reveal 
some additional problems in both these aspects within the Rwandan system.   
 
On influence and control, as we have already seen at cell and sector level, committee/council 
members – either through job contracts within the public service or less formal socio-political 
networks – are often dependent on and therefore subservient to the Executive Secretary.  It is 
therefore unsurprising that none of the local authorities interviewed could explain, when asked, the 
process through which decisions are reached when multiple views are expressed in council meetings.  
Instead, authorities at cell and sector level report that decisions are reached by consensus and there is 
never a problem of disagreement.  At district level, as one interviewee notes, the problem appears 
compounded by the fact that councillors do not have access to the necessary documentation in 
advance of meetings and therefore have no basis on which to make decisions.   
 
 Often they [district councillors] don‟t see any documents. It‟s interesting.  Often even for the 
budget, or whatever, they should approve all those documents, but in fact they don‟t see them 
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 None of the interviewees at any level could specify the exact number of reserved seats at Sector and District levels. 
42
 These are selected / elected from within their own associations. 
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at all, or they don‟t have any time to prepare. So it just „ok fine‟ once it comes to making a 
decision. 
     (Representative of international agency, Kigali) 
 
Regarding representation and accountability, elected leaders were asked how they mediate with and 
assure accountability to their constituents.  The findings reinforce those in the previous section where 
little evidence of representation was apparent – most notably at district level where citizens are 
unaware who their representatives are.  Thus, in response to a question on how he represents his 
constituents in his role as President of the cell committee, one interviewee responds that this is done 
by ―explaining to the community what has come from the higher authorities.”  The range of activities 
and directives discussed at monthly cell committee meetings are communicated by members when 
they return to their villages and villages are mobilised accordingly.  The minutes of one recent cell 
committee meeting examined during the field research comprised the following items: a security 
update; plans for the preparation of Hero‘s Day43 celebrations; organisation of communal labour for 
local youth about to commence their national service
44
; and sensitisation regarding mutuelle 
payments.  A sector council member interviewed however notes that this is a two-way process and 
that her role is also to bring issues from her cell constituents to the sector council for discussion.  I 
oversee the population. I see what the plans for the sector are and I take them to the cell level at the 
cell level meetings. And at the cell meetings, I can also hear about different problems or issues that 
are happening in the cell and I can take these to the sector level.”  There does therefore, among 
those directly elected, appear to be some level of representation – although the basis for selection 
regarding who or what is represented remains unclear.  At district level, councillors interviewed 
struggled to explain their link to citizens.  Most noted that citizen participation was assured through 
the planning process with priorities from villages feeding up to cells, those from cells to sectors, and 
those from sectors to DDPs.  One vice-mayor also noted that she was elected on a platform
45
, with 
citizens aware of her platform (which, she notes, is to represent women), therefore this is how she 
represents them.  While cell and sector councillors attend monthly umuganda meetings where 
citizens have an opportunity to express their views and concerns (see the following section), 
attendance at these fora by district councillors is reported to be rare. 
 
Of course all of these issues are certainly not unique to Rwanda.  In fact they mirror issues reported 
elsewhere, together with the shortcomings of procedural participation and representative democracy 
more broadly in the global South and North alike.  For these reasons, the last thirty years have 
witnessed increased interest in and support for more substantive forms of participation which provide 
for ongoing citizen influence and control over decisions and policies affecting their local, daily lives.  
As we have seen in Section 3.2, an ethos of substantive participation was one of the driving forces of 
Rwanda‘s decentralisation process from the outset.  How this is played out in practice is examined in 
the following section. 
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 Hero‘s Day, which falls on Feb 1st, is one of a number of annual celebrations commemorating the ―liberation 
struggle‖, as it is now known, from 1990-1994 and the ensuing genocide.  See ―Rwandans mark Heroes Day‖ and 
―Kagame pays Tribute to Fallen Heroes‖, The New Times February 1st, 2013. 
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 All male second level graduates are obliged to carry out three months of National Service. 
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3.3.4  Substantive participation 
 
As we have already seen, relevant policy and legislation emphasises that the opportunity for citizens 
to engage, deliberate and take decisions on local issues and priorities lies at the heart of Rwanda‘s 
decentralisation process.  This more substantive form of participation is facilitated through three 
principle mechanisms which are discussed below. 
 
Ubudehe 
 
Possibly the most innovative mechanism affording citizen participation is that of ubudehe.  Ubudehe 
is described as ―the traditional Rwandan practice and cultural value of working together to solve 
problems” (MINALOC, n.d.: 1). Applied in the context of decentralisation, ubudehe is a process 
developed by MINALOC which involves a four step process - social classification (assigning people 
to wealth/poverty-based ubudehe categories); social mapping; prioritisation of problems; and the 
elaboration of a strategy and action plan to address these problems (MINALOC, n.d).  Community 
trainers have been trained to facilitate communities through these four steps.  The process was 
piloted in 2001-2003 and rolled out nationwide in 2004-2006 with the first social maps produced in 
2006.  In 2008, the process won a UN Public Service award and, according to Shah (2013), by 2010 
a map for every village throughout the country had been produced.  Action plans aimed at addressing 
identified priorities were funded through a Community Development Fund provided by the EU and 
administered through MINALOC.  In December of 2010, the NISR and the Ministry of Health 
produced a national database of statistics from ubudehe poverty classification data and, for the first 
time, began to link VUP
46
 payments and mutuelle obligations to these ubudehe categorisations.   
 
While there has been little empirical research on this process, the small amount of existing research 
appears quite positive.  Shah (2011) argues that ubudehe represents ―a paradox of hidden democracy 
amid autocracy‖ and, in a later contribution (Shah, 2013), argues that ubudehe “has contributed to 
democratization in Rwanda through the introduction of elements of village level participatory 
democracy and through a less tangible impact on a broader shift from an „obedience culture‟ to a 
„citizenship culture‟ in the country.” 
 
Strong efforts were made over the course of this research to uncover more information on the 
ubudehe process.  However, all that is left of this process today is the first step only – social 
categorisation for the purposes of targeting citizens for VUP and mutuelle payments.  When asked 
about the ubudehe process within their villages, citizens instantly responded with their own 
categorisation – “I am in category 3” etc., with many following up to express dissatisfaction with 
this.  This research uncovered no evidence of trained community facilitators.  Instead village leaders 
lead the categorisation process during umuganda meetings.  Villagers propose categories for 
different households.  However, the final decision on categorisation is made at cell level by the cell 
leader and it now appears that resource availability for welfare schemes linked to the process rather 
than community preferences dictate the final categorisation.   
 
So what happened to ubudehe?  How did it change from an exciting, innovative mechanism of 
substantive participation to an externally driven social classification exercise?  Three principal 
factors appear to have contributed to its demise.  First, the EU fund administered through MINALOC 
for plans and projects prioritised through the process no longer exists.  Second and allied to this, 
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many of the issues prioritised by communities for action requiring outside assistance were not 
actually addressed.  Consequently, as one interviewee explained ―in doing the same exercise each 
year, the problems remained the same.  The solutions were coming drip by drip [very slowly if at 
all].  There weren‟t really many changes.”.  Third, the spirit and functioning of the mechanism 
changed considerably since its linkage to welfare schemes in late 2010.  Ubudehe is now conceived 
and understood as a classification exercise.  While communities participate during village meetings 
in assigning categories to households, the final decision rests with the cell leader and, with limited 
resources available for associated welfare schemes (most notably the mutuelle), these decisions are 
now necessarily based on resource availability rather than community classifications with 
households in categories 1 and 2 receiving some VUP assistance and having their mutuelle 
contributions paid for them by the state.  As we will see below, there is considerable evidence of a 
consequent ‗upgrading‘ of households to Category 3 for these reasons. 
 
Individual participants in field research for this project were asked about the ubudehe process in their 
village.  Their categorisations for this year and last are set out in Figure 3.3.4a below. 
 
Figure 3.3.4a: Ubudehe categories for interviewees in 2011/12 and 2012/13 
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The majority of individual interviewees (64% - 70% male; 59% female) are currently in ubudehe 
category 3.  The percentage of interviewees in this category is markedly lower in Site A (Gakenke 
district (30%)) than in the others (between 60% and 80%).  Overall, the next most common category 
among interviewees is category 2 (19% overall – 15% male; 22% female) with again, a markedly 
higher proportion of interviewees from Site A (Gakenke (50%)) than elsewhere within this category.  
5% (4% male; 6% female) of interviewees are in Category 4; 2% (all female and all from Site E 
(Kansi Sector in Gisagara district) in Category 1; and 10% (11% male; 9% female) do not know 
what their category is
47
.   
 
As noted above, in late 2010, ubudehe categorisation became linked to mutuelle payments with 
Category 1 and 2 households having their mutuelle fees waived, Category 3 households having to 
pay FrRw 3,000 per person and Category 4s reportedly having to pay FrRw 7,000 per person.  This 
development has coincided with some changes in ubudehe categorisations across all sites.  Overall, 
58% of interviewees‘ households lie in the same category as last year, 33% have changed category, 
and 9% are unsure of their category.  31% have been moved upward in category while 2% been have 
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moved downward.  Of these, the vast majority (25%) have been moved from Category 2 to Category 
3 meaning, as most are quick to point out, they now have to pay FrRw 3,000 per person for their 
mutuelle.  This trend is particularly prevalent among interviewees in Site C (Nyamagabe district) 
where 50% have been moved from Category 2 to 3.  A further 2% have been moved from Category 1 
to 2 (a number of these on their own request as they did not wish to be associated with the ―typical 
Category 1 type” described by local authorities as someone with no self-respect left to eat the 
crumbs of others
48
); 2% from Category 3 to 4; 2% from Category 1 to 3; and 2% from Category 4 to 
3.   
 
The changes in ubudehe categorisations may reflect general improvements in poverty levels 
indicated by official government statistics deriving from household surveys as discussed in Section 
3.1).  Or they may reflect the need for greater cost-sharing in state expenditure on welfare schemes.  
The manner in which ubudehe categorisations are made and the level of public satisfaction with 
these provide an indication of this.  Interviewees and FG participants were asked to describe the 
process through which these categorisations are agreed.  Some interviewees describe a process 
resembling that outlined by Shah (2013) whereby community members, in a community meeting 
with the village leader, assign categories to all households.  They note however that these categories 
may subsequently change as the final decision rests with cell leaders.  Other interviewees claim that 
cell leaders alone make the decision with no discussion within village meetings.  Whatever the level 
of village engagement however, all interviewees in all sites agree that the final decision on 
categorisation rests with cell leaders.  For their part, cell leaders interviewed note that they need to 
consider public resources when assigning households to particular categories.   
 
Bearing in mind the strong link between horizontal inequalities, political marginalisation, grievance 
and conflict outlined in Section 3.2, perhaps the most important question is the degree to which 
citizens are satisfied with their categorisation.  As outlined in Figure 3.3.4b below, of the 59 citizens 
interviewed, a slight majority (49% - 52% male; 47% female) are unhappy with their categorisation; 
41% (37% male; 44% female) are satisfied and 10%, not knowing their category, did not respond to 
the question.  There are some slight variations from site to site with a low (20%) level of 
dissatisfaction in Site A (Gakenke) (where 50% of interviewees were in Category 2 and just 30% in 
Category 3 – 20% did not know their category) compared to a high level (82%) in Site E (Kansi 
sector in Gisagara) where the highest percentage of interviewees – 73% - lie in Category 3.  While, 
given the small sample size, these figures in no way reflect overall ubudehe categorisations in the 
sites sampled nor indeed nationally, both the correlation between high levels of level 3 
categorisations and levels of dissatisfaction with these and the tendency to re-categorise upward do 
suggest a growing dissatisfaction with authorities‘ cost-sharing policy regarding social welfare 
programmes.  This represents a significant challenge for peacebuilding moving on into the future.   
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Figure 3.3.4b: Levels of satisfaction with ubudehe categorisation 
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While these findings demonstrate the demise of ubudehe as a mechanism for substantive 
participation, a number of interviewees argue that its spirit continues in the dialogue, discussions and 
planning sessions which take place at monthly umuganda meetings.  This second mechanism is 
discussed below. 
 
 
Umuganda 
 
Umuganda refers to the Rwandan tradition of communal labour on public projects.  On the last 
Saturday of every month, all Rwandans are obliged to participate in communal labour works.  
Following the physical work, a meeting is held where, in theory, the communal work carried out that 
day is evaluated and plans for further works are discussed and agreed, together with community 
issues and plans more broadly.  The issues raised at these meetings are supposed to feed upward to 
cell, sector, and district plans with, every five years, a formal upward-planning process taking place 
for the development of the DDP.  In interview, when asked about citizen participation in this 
planning process, all local authorities stressed that the DDP draws from priorities identified by 
communities during umuganda meetings, although there is some variation in various accounts on the 
specific process for this.  Generally the reported process is as follows. It begins with a prioritisation 
of issues at village level. The resultant list of priorities is then sent to the cell.  These lists are collated 
and re-prioritised by the cell committee and sent to the sector.  The sector council then collates and 
re-prioritises and a list is sent to the district.  At district level, DDPs are said to ‗draw from‘ these 
lists and specific programmes, projects and activities from the resultant DDP are then communicated 
back down to sector, cell and villages for implementation.   
 
For meaningful substantive participation to take place within any policy or planning sphere, there 
needs to be a well worked out system of ranking / prioritisation of preferences which is open, 
transparent, and follows a set of clearly defined criteria.  Local officials were asked what the process 
for prioritisation was at each level.  Nobody was able to provide a clear response to this question.  At 
cell and sector level, it is particularly unclear, with leaders suggesting that issues from all cells and 
villages are the same. ―The priorities are similar. They are almost the same with all the cells so it is 
not like a big problem how to prioritise. All the cells seem to be on the same level.” (Sector 
Executive Secretary, Site E).  At district level, a range of factors come into play including sectoral, 
ministry plans, national plans, budgets, etc. In a process which, this time round, has been coordinated 
by MINECOFIN rather than MINALOC, the current round (2013) of DDPs are being drawn up by 
48 | P a g e  
 
consultants.  Again, none of the interviewees could respond to questions on prioritisation criteria or 
levels of influence at this level although it was noted that national strategies and plans as well as 
budgetary constraints constitute important factors. 
 
 
We see all the problems coming from the sector and we have a team that deliberates on this 
at the level of this district. It depends on the budget that we have and we select the ones that 
are high priority. 
       (Vice Mayor, Site D) 
 
The current plan is for five years. It commences at the most local level. We are in the month 
of February.  We started last March. We started in the villages, we assembled the priorities 
and onto the cell, and onto the sector. There was a calendar which was given by 
MINECOFIN.  There were plans for the level of the district, for the level of the province, and 
at a national level. We have also other plans, for example Vision 2020.  We have tried to 
include the priorities of the different ministries... We also try to look at the EDPRS.  There 
are also the MDGs.  These are all different plans but they show the priorities of the 
government. We contract a consultant to bring together all of these ideas...  If you have the 
opportunity to analyse these different plans, they are all complementary. If I go into the 
EDPRS, the main areas are the same although the targets may differ. There is no difference 
between the needs of our population and what is in these documents. In the domain of 
economics, the priorities are the same. In the social domain, they are the same, water and 
sanitation, electricity, there is no difference. No document merits more attention than the 
other.   
       (District Executive Secretary, Site B) 
 
 
Despite the bottom-up rhetoric, the consistent failure to explain the prioritisation process for different 
inputs / ideas / proposals at the different levels together with the myriad of national level priorities 
and plans which also need to be represented within DDPs suggests that, even if citizens are 
consulted, their inputs wield little influence.  Indeed, a representative from an international agency 
supporting the local planning process claims that the current process, organised by MINECOFIN and 
conducted in considerable haste, was merely a desk-based exercise with no field visits and no use of 
local plans of any sort.  
 
Although the link between umuganda discussions and the planning process appear weak or non-
existent therefore, it is important to note that, in a significant and decisive break with pre-1994 
umuganda works, discussions and deliberations do indeed take place following the completion of 
communal labour.  Many interviewees (state and civil society) were extremely keen to point out that 
these meetings represent important democratic spaces for citizens to speak out openly and freely as 
envisaged within the original decentralisation policy. 
 
While being free to speak out is certainly extremely important, both the specific communication act 
(questioning, proposing, advocating, sensitising, criticising etc.) and its reception (ignored, 
applauded, acted upon etc.) are also important.  What is the point in speaking if no one is listening 
and no action results?  The level and quality of communication within umuganda meetings were 
examined in two ways in this research.  First, individual interviewees were asked if they participate 
in umuganda meetings and, if so, have they ever spoken and for what purpose.  The responses are 
summarised in Figure 3.3.4c below 
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Figure 3.3.4c: Levels of participation in umuganda meetings 
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Overall, 86% (89% male; 83% female) of interviewees report that they regularly attend their 
meetings although 93% (93% male; 94% female) report participating in umuganda communal 
labour.  Of those attending meetings, 46% (37% male; 53% female) have never spoken at a meeting.  
This percentage in particularly elevated in Sites A and B (the Northern districts of Gakenke and 
Rulindo) where 80% of interviewees have never spoken at a local meeting.  Of those that have 
overall, 24% (30% male; 19% female) have made a complaint or sought financial aid either for 
themselves or a neighbour; 8.5% (11% male; 6% female) have asked a question, and 8.5% (11% 
male; 6% female)
49
 have used the opportunity to sensitise people on a particular issue – e.g. family 
planning.   
 
Individual interviewees were asked what issues were raised for discussion in umuganda meetings.  
15% (14% male; 16% female) talked of sensitisation by local authorities in three main areas – 
payments for services and programmes (school building programmes, mutuelle etc.); land 
consolidation plans / orders on what crops to grow where; and village and house cleaning 
programmes.  A further 15% (19% male; 13% female) talked of the organisation of the work for the 
coming umuganda.  24% (23% male; 25% female) raised both these issues.  38% (41% male; 34% 
female) talked of security updates, with 33% raising them in conjunction with the other issues cited 
above.  Thus, the main topics for discussion are payments – in cash and kind – for local programmes 
and local security issues.  This echoes findings on citizens‘ views of the role of local authorities (see 
Figure 3.3.2a previously). 
 
To triangulate these findings and obtain a clearer idea of how umuganda works in practice, field 
research included a structured observation of an end of month Saturday umuganda session in a 
working class neighbourhood in Kigali.  While the aim had been to attend umuganda in one of the 
research sites, circulation restrictions did not allow us to reach the site
50
 and so we (my translator and 
I) travelled to the Kigali site on foot instead.  I carried out a structured observation where I 
documented and timed all interventions.  I later coded these into the different forms of intervention 
from the different participants resulting in Table 3.3.4 below.   
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Table 3.3.4: Results from a structured observation of Umuganda discussions in Kigali city 
 
 
Type of intervention Speaker Gender Length of time 
spoken (mins) 
Introductions Cell Executive Secretary Male 3 
Announcements  Cell Executive Secretary Male 10 
Questions Citizens Male (x10) 
Female (x2) 
10 
Responses Sector Council member 
District Council member 
Cell Executive Secretary 
Female 
Male 
Male 
7 
13 
5 
Wrap up Cell Executive Secretary Male 2 
 
It is worth recounting in full the detail of the meeting as the tenor and issues raised provide valuable 
insights into local authority – citizen relations.  The meeting, which took place outside the cell office 
following the communal labour (which consisted of cleaning and digging ditches on the sides of a 
number of nearby unpaved roads), lasted 50 minutes in total.  Sitting at the top table were the cell 
Executive Secretary (male) who chaired the meeting, 4 members of his committee (all male), a 
female delegate
51
 from the sector who is in charge of elections, and a male member of the district 
council.  Approximately 300 citizens were in attendance.  There were a few benches and everyone 
else stood.   
 
Over the 50 minutes of the meeting, the cell, sector and district officials spoke for a total of 40, or 
80% of the total time.  Citizens – 10 men and 2 women – spoke for a total of 10 minutes, or 20% of 
the total time.   
 
The meeting began with introductions of the different people at the top table by the cell leader.  He 
then continued with five announcements.  The first was to sensitise citizens to separate their 
recyclable waste including plastic bottles, disposing of this in the recycle bins provided by the 
private company contracted for this purpose.  The second announcement was that the fee for this 
recyclable waste collection has now been raised from FrRw 1,000 to 3,000 per month per household 
as the cell leaders have changed the company they are contracting for this.  The third was the 
announcement of the introduction of an additional financial contribution of FrRw 5,000 per month 
for a new Education Fund.  This was to be introduced with immediate effect.  This was met with 
some murmurs of protest from participants.  The cell leader responded that households would have to 
contribute at least FrRw 3,000 and that he would visit each house during the coming week to collect 
this.  The fourth announcement was than all members of households, and not just their heads, must 
participate in umuganda communal labour.  Furthermore, they should all bring their own hoe. 
Individuals turning up without a hoe will be recorded as absent and will be fined accordingly (FrRw 
5,000).  The fifth announcement was to request members of the local branch of the RPF to stay on 
after the meeting as a party meeting would take place thereafter.  The cell leader then asked if 
anyone present had any questions. 
 
The first question came from a man, roughly in his 30s, who asked why they are being continually 
asked for so many financial contributions.  Listing contributions relating to security, the mutuelle, the 
schools, and waste collection, he claimed this was all too much and unaffordable for households.  
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His intervention was met with good natured laughter and a round of applause from other participants.  
A younger man, roughly in his 20s, then stepped up and asked what the new education contribution 
is for, given that they have already contributed for schools in the area.  A third man, roughly in his 
30s, asked a question about umuganda participation, asking what a household with a wife and young 
children could do if all over 18 are obliged to participate.  A fourth man, again roughly in his 30s, 
asked for precision on whether the new FrRw 5,000 education contribution is per individual or per 
household.  The cell leader briefly responded to this question, confirming it was per household.  A 
fifth man, roughly in his 50s, noted that umuganda communal works should be organised to fix the 
bridge on the river nearby as it has become dangerous and many people pass by every day.   
 
Following these 8 minutes of citizen intervention, the cell leader invited the authorities at the top 
table to respond.  The sector representative was first to speak.  She noted that the financial 
contributions are for everyone‘s common interest and that ―the government wants everyone to 
participate”.  She explained the Education Fund was like the mutuelle and was to allow the 
government to meet its targets in extending the ‗9 years basic education‘ to 10 years52.  She added 
that this contribution will only be for some time and said that anyone who is unable to pay should 
come to see ‗us‘ (it was unspecified who exactly), and they would sign a paper exempting them from 
this obligation.  Regarding the final question on the bridge, she noted that the bridge is not included 
in the DDP and that the cell authorities cannot afford to do this maintenance themselves.  She asked 
the District representative present to lobby on their behalf for assistance on this at district level.  
Addressing problem of childcare and umuganda participation, she noted that “the rules are written 
but the implementation is always different” and the head of the household just needs to explain the 
situation to the cell leader who will exempt his wife from participation.   
 
The district representative then stepped up to respond.  His intervention was framed more as a 
general sensitisation beginning with the reminder that both umuganda and financial contributions are 
all required by the government for citizens‘ benefit.  He asked what should they (the authorities) 
stop.  Should they stop the mutuelle?  Participants responded in chorus, no.  Should they stop 
education?  Again, a chorus of no.  Security? No.  He then asked if anyone present knew how much 
education costs the state.  Failing to provide a figure, he went on to stress that FrRw 5,000 is 
necessary but those who feel they cannot pay can discuss this with the authorities.  He added that the 
government cannot achieve its vision with contributions of just FrRw 1,000.  With regard to the 
question on increases in waste charges, he noted that “a study has been done and the Sector 
committee and authorities have decided that FrRw 5,000 is required from each household”, adding 
that he pays FrRw 5,000 in his cell.   
 
The cell leader briefly intervened at this point to argue that all studies done at sector level should be 
announced to the population.  This intervention was applauded by participants. 
 
A woman, roughly in her 30s, then rose to speak.  She asked whether if, in the case of casual workers 
such as herself, it would be possible for the authorities to collect the money when they have it rather 
than wait until the end of the month, as it is spent by this time. 
 
The district representative responded that this should be possible.  He added that the sector 
representative should respond to the comment on informing the population regarding studies as the 
waste study was conducted at sector level. 
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The sector representative then responded that although the sector committee decided on the FrRw 
3,000 fee, this was following instructions from the Rwanda Regulatory Society who advised between 
FrRw 3,500 and 5,000.  The sector committee then decided on FrRw 3,000.  She agreed that 
everything was getting expensive but asked people to make the effort as it is important to have a city 
that is clean.  On the education fee, contradicting the earlier information provided, she noted that this 
is FrRw 5,000 per year and not per month and that this can be paid in instalments. 
 
The district representative then attempted to wrap up the session beginning “It‟s clear I think.  
Please follow up and do what we ask.  If you don‟t understand something or if your security is not 
assured, come and tell us.  I will lobby for your bridge at the district and will keep you updated.” 
 
A woman, roughly in her 40s, then stood to ask if the waste charges also apply to businesses and will 
larger businesses pay more. 
 
The cell leader failed to directly answer the question but responded that all businesses would pay and 
the waste disposal company will make the contract with each payee.  Attempting to bring 
proceedings to a close, he thanked the ‗visitors‘ at the top table.  Noting that participants had solely 
applauded interventions questioning financial contributions, he reprimanded them for not applauding 
the interventions from their leaders asking if they were not content with the responses.  No applause 
ensued.  He then added that the sector should look for tenders from waste disposal companies and 
then select the lowest tender.   
 
The sector representative responded saying she agreed and admitted the sector had not had time to 
look for tenders.  She promised to see has the district obtained tenders and come back to the 
population with feedback.  This intervention was met with enthusiastic applause with the sector 
representative responding that “this is what decentralisation means – that the population takes part 
in decisions.  We will come back with a solution.” 
 
Once more the cell leader then tried to bring the meeting to a close.  However, another man, roughly 
in his 20s, rose to report a break-in in his house at 2am that morning and to complain that the citizen 
in charge of security that night did not arrive when notified.  The cell leader responded that he would 
visit him during the week and ‗take action‟ (what such action might be remained unspecified).  
Another man, roughly in his 40s, then intervened to note that the citizen in charge of security in 
question is an Adventist and therefore should be replaced from Saturday duties
53
.  At this point the 
meeting ended abruptly. 
 
A number of points may be drawn from this detailed account.  First, the observation corroborates 
interview data that umuganda meetings do provide citizens with an opportunity to voice their issues, 
ideas and concerns.  Although citizens were afforded just a fifth of the overall time, with a number 
insisting on this despite leaders attempts to draw proceedings to a close prematurely, and although 
the interventions were from just 4% of the total population present – with these being predominantly 
men, the insistence of a number of participants in speaking, together with broader participation 
through, at various times, applause, laughter and murmurs of dissent suggest a strong public appetite 
for participation.  Second, the meeting demonstrates a level of accountability from local leaders 
when they are challenged by citizens.  There is also however – most notably in the case of the 
announced increase in waste charges - evidence of a) passing the buck / blaming higher levels for 
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inadequacies; and b) admonishment of citizens themselves – this is most notable in the district 
officials‘ interventions where superior budgetary knowledge and ‗studies‘ are invoked to silence 
dissent as well as in the cell leader‘s (unanswered) appeal for applause for sector and district leader 
responses.  Third – and probably most striking, considerable disquiet at the imposition of arbitrary 
taxes / financial contributions is evident.  Three further points in relation to these taxes are 
noteworthy – a) their arbitrary nature; b) the lack of clarity on how much they actually cost (the 
Education Fund moved from FrRw 5,000 to 3,000 and from a monthly to an annual payment in the 
space of a 50 minute meeting); and c) their negotiability on a case by case basis.  These issues are 
discussed further the next section on participation as cost-sharing.  Fourth, while significant 
resistance to arbitrary taxation is apparent, there appears to be some engagement with the communal 
labour component of umuganda as evidenced by the proposal for work on the nearby bridge.  
Unfortunately, although this is clearly a community priority, its omission from the DDP is clearly an 
obstacle in including it in umuganda planning.  Again, reinforcing findings reported earlier, this calls 
into question the rhetoric of bottom-up planning.   
 
Overall, although clearly a distance from the broad, open dialogue among citizens themselves 
envisaged by the original policy, and also, as a number of participants noted privately to me at the 
end, probably not very representative of less open umuganda meetings in rural districts, the meeting 
nonetheless illustrates that a space exists for citizens to voice their views and, perhaps more 
importantly, they appear keen and not afraid to exercise this voice – most particularly in relation to 
dissent and concern on the growing number of arbitrary taxes.  What is not so clear however, is 
whether these concerns are genuinely being heard and acted upon.  These concerns in relation to 
taxation are discussed further in the following section.  Before turning to this however, we will 
examine one final mechanism in place for substantive participation at district level. 
 
 
Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) 
 
One of the main organs of citizen participation identified by a number of officials and NGOs alike is 
the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF).  Organised and run by district officials, the JADF was 
established as a forum for dialogue among the principle development partners at district level and, in 
theory, opens a space for NGOs and local associations to raise issues from their constituencies.  In 
practice however, the JADF principally functions as a way of coordinating interventions and 
exchanging information on who is doing what.  As the JADF Permanent Secretary in one district 
visited explains, ―The JADF is the forum of partners, all of the partners who have activities in the 
district, to see what it is they do... We do a plan of action together, we do monitoring, and evaluation 
of activities of each development partner in each sector.”  There are 27 international agencies and 16 
local associations – including local churches, NGOs, banks, insurance companies – involved in the 
JADF in this district which meets every three months. 
 
As a forum for coordination of activities, the JADF appears to function well.  However, as a forum 
for dialogue and a space for substantive citizen participation, it suffers in a number of respects.  First, 
its role and mandate are unclear to participants.  Second, participants appear to participate passively 
rather than actively – in part due to confusion on the function of the assembly, and in part due to 
insufficient time in preparing for it.  One commentator explains the problems: 
 
The role and the mandate of the JADF is still not clear... And it doesn‟t work in practice 
because the playing field is not level. So in theory you have the tripartite [state, local civil 
society, donor agencies] multi-stakeholder dialogue. But it‟s the local government that is 
initiating the meeting very often. The chairperson is the Vice Mayor. So there is already a 
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difference in power obviously which you cannot bridge easily.  And then people are invited 
late.  They don‟t receive an agenda. They cannot provide any inputs. If they do, these are not 
taken into account.  And it is very selective in who participates. 
        (JADF member, Site D) 
 
And third, even where space is available for more substantive inputs, citizens themselves do not 
actually participate.  While civil society groups often claim to represent their constituents‘ interests, 
this cannot be presumed in the Rwandan context where a number of studies highlight the highly 
clientelist nature of civil society and its consequent weakness in representing the more marginalised 
and vulnerable (IRDP, 2008; Ingelaere, 2010a; Civicus, 2011; Gready, 2011).  In this context, the 
IRDP finding that just 0.1% of citizens get their information from local civil society organisations is 
revealing (IRDP, 2011a: 140)
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Overall therefore, the findings reveal that some spaces for substantive citizen participation exist and 
that there appears quite considerable enthusiasm to use them.  The findings also reveal however that 
these spaces have closed somewhat over time – in the cases of both ubudehe and the JADF, fulfilling 
functions other than that for which they were originally intended.  Possible reasons for this are 
discussed in further detail in the concluding section.  For now however we turn to the third, and most 
prevalent form of participation within Rwanda‘s local system – participation as cost-sharing. 
 
 
3.3.5 Participation as cost-sharing 
 
As the RGB‘s Citizen Report Card research has revealed and, as this research has substantiated, the 
most common form of participation in Rwanda‘s local governance process is cost-sharing.  This 
takes two forms – physical contributions in the form of umuganda communal labour work and 
financial contributions in the form of arbitrary, ad hoc taxes imposed for different activities and 
services.  These are discussed in turn below. 
 
Umuganda communal labour 
 
As we have seen, umuganda communal labour is held on the last Saturday morning of every month.  
On this morning, all citizens are obliged to report to their cell office for work.  They generally have 
been notified in advance of what work is to take place.  While umuganda works officially take place 
just once a month, in rural areas they are far more frequent.  In the sites visited for this research, 
communal labour works were being organised 2-3 times a week.  Many of these involved 
construction projects – schools, credit and savings facilities55 and offices for cell leaders56 were 
among the most common activities.   
 
Questioned as to how citizen participation is assured in local governance, many local authority 
leaders interviewed referred to these communal labour works.  For example, a sector leader who has 
received NGO training in participation responds: 
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The participation of the population, that is when you can use them well. For construction of 
the bridge [in the sector centre] for example. When there is an election coming up, you know 
how to mobilise the population.  For example the credit and saving building [local SACCO] 
was built by the population. There were no funds from the government or from any 
organisations. We just needed to mobilise the population and it was built. 
       (Sector Executive Secretary, Site A) 
 
Again, a district vice-mayor echoes this understanding.   
 
We plan development projects - economic or social.  We start the district planning from what 
the sector has shown as priorities.  Having done this planning, we start the execution and we 
make sure that there is citizen participation in the execution at all stages. For example here 
[district centre] we need to construct a building for health [health centre].  We need to find 
land, and the lands will be worked by the population. That is their participation. 
        (District Vice-Mayor, Site C) 
 
 
While the frequency of umuganda obligations might seem a little too much for citizens, individual 
interviewees, when asked about the usefulness of these works, were generally very positive.  86% of 
interviewees (89% male; 84% female) asserted that it is important to work for the country.  For these 
respondents, there is some ambiguity in terms of who benefits.  While most noted that they benefit 
from construction and maintenance projects (schools, health clinics, SACCOs, road maintenance 
etc), at the same time they stressed the importance of working for authorities (cell office 
construction, cleaning of genocide memorials etc.).  Given the origins of the term umuganda, it is 
noteworthy that just 5% of interviewees (4% male; 6% female) noted that umuganda is useful as it 
allows the community to help those less well off – notably the ubudehe category 1 households for 
whom umuganda labour workers built houses when their traditional thatch homes were destroyed 
last year
57
.  A FG participant explains her views on the process. 
 
 
It is a good thing.  There is a school here that was built recently and we are now starting a 
second school and this also is being done through umuganda.  If you cannot participate you 
must pay [FrRw] 1000 a day to replace your labour. Even those people who resist, who do 
not attend willingly, during the umuganda meetings they are blamed.   
(Participant FG women, Site B) 
 
 
Financial contributions 
 
As well as contributing labour, citizens are also required to financially contribute to a range of 
projects and programmes including local building projects, services and the public health insurance 
scheme – the mutuelle.  As we have seen in the umuganda session outlined above, these payments 
prove extremely difficult for families and households which are already struggling to meet their daily 
requirements and are the source of growing resentment and frustration.  There are a number of 
reasons for this growing unease. 
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First, for many households it simply proves too difficult to manage to pay these obligatory 
contributions.  As we have seen, one of the payments consistently highlighted – partly because of 
cost and partly because of worries over not being able to access health care – is the health insurance 
premium, the mutuelle.  As we have seen, with an increasing number of households being 
recategorised upward in the ubudehe scheme, increasing numbers are having to pay this themselves.  
While some interviewees related stories of coercion by local leaders in efforts to bring in these 
payments in the past (forcing households to sell some livestock for example), the current strategy 
appears to be to force citizens to take out loans.  Participants in two FGs explain how they have 
managed. 
 
We have made associations [groupings of a number of households] and borrowed money 
from the bank to pay our mutuelle.  All of us here have done this. 
       (Participant FG men, Site A) 
 
 
For the health insurance it is mandatory.  You must pay this. Last year they brought us books 
from the bank.  The cell leader brought these.  So whenever you get [FrRw] 500 you take this 
to the village chief.  He takes the money and he signs that he has deposited this. So by the 
time of buying a new health insurance, they saw how much we had deposited.  If we had not 
deposited enough, they [cell authorities] would lend us the money.  So now some of us are 
paying back for this. 
       (Participant FG women, Site B)  
 
 
Second, there is a lack of clarity around local budgets.  As we have seen in Section 3.3.2, citizens are 
not familiar with even the broad contours of local budgets, including sectoral allocations.  While the 
percentage of devolved resources is reported to have increased to approximately 33% in recent years 
(MINALOC, 2013b: 19 – following MINECOFIN figures), discussions with budget officers in two 
districts visited reveals confusion regarding both the provenance (direct ministerial transfers vs. 
block grants. vs. earmarked donor funds – these are all included together in budgets) and the 
destination (district, sector or cell – this information is not available) of these funds.  The sectoral 
breakdown of funds (health vs. education vs. cell office construction etc.) also remains unclear. 
 
Third, for particularly vulnerable households (ubudehe categories 1 and 2), there are reports of 
welfare payments being used to pay these arbitrary taxes.  A representative from one of the 
international agencies supporting one of the welfare programmes outlines the issue. 
 
I want to talk about the extent to which households have free choice in how they use those 
[welfare] resources in the current context. For example in our programme, when it was in 
full pelt, if you talked to people about what they spend their money on, a lot of it was spent on 
iron sheeting for their roofs [an obligatory purchase last year when thatch roofs were 
outlawed]. This is a very delicate area and it‟s a very tricky one but I think there is something 
there about the extent to which households have full control of the choices they make and 
about the resources they receive when local space is so controlled by the sector 
administration in terms of how a household behaves and the contributions they have to make. 
 
...The other example would be, recently our head of office went out to visit some schools.   
VUP beneficiaries there were complaining about the fact they had to contribute to the school 
fund and they had to use some of their cash transfer to do that.  In a sense there is a question 
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about how fungible the money is from the government perspective because it is given out by 
the government but it often also gets reabsorbed in a circular motion. 
      (Representative of international agency, Kigali) 
 
 
Fourth, it remains unclear to citizens how much of the collected taxes are actually used as they 
should be.  As one interviewee notes 
 
You have to pay for the community policing. Do a simple calculation. You pay 1000 per 
month. And this is an area of 800 household so it is already 800,000. And imagine, the guy 
earns maximum 15,000 per month. And they have 5 people.  So that‟s 75,000.  So what 
happens with the 725,000 FrRw?  Nobody knows.  And this is just one contribution. Then you 
have to pay here and you have to pay there. And it‟s always more and more and more. And 
you don‟t know what‟s happening with the money.  
 
 
While President Kagame exercises a strict no tolerance policy for corruption at national level, there 
are broad allegations of small scale corruption or ―manipulation‖ at local level, in part exacerbated 
by the reliance on voluntary labour from local leaders at the most local levels and in part by the 
clientelist nature of local leadership.  As one state interviewee notes: 
 
The social protection schemes here are very well manipulated. You find this, for instance, 
with the funds to support the genocide survivors.  Everybody is so poor, so they try to make 
false lists and so on. And then we find a brother to [X – speaker gives own name] who is on 
the list for that. So people try to access whatever facility is in place...  it happens at a level 
where you can‟t call it corruption.  It‟s manipulation really.  It‟s really acceptable and 
common. It is acceptable. It is accepted. But it is really dangerous.   
 
(Representative of national state agency, Kigali)  
       
 
And fifth, as we have seen in the account of the umuganda meeting in Kigali, citizens complain that 
the number and amount of these contributions are rapidly escalating.  This is borne out by the 
government‘s own plans for local revenue generation.  The revised Decentralisation Policy notes the 
low level of revenue generation at local level and is aiming to increase this significantly ―Districts 
generate only between 5-20% of their budgets. MINECOFIN is in the process of commissioning a 
revenue potential study for districts to determine the potential of districts after which baselines will 
be determined and targets set for revenue improvement…. It is anticipated that with effective tax 
administration, within the first year of implementing the LG tax law, local government revenues will 
increase from the present RwF 16 billion to as much as RwF 90 billion.‖ (MINALOC, 2013b: 19).  
In addition, in the wake of aid cuts at the beginning of 2013, the government introduced a new tax to 
fund a new Rwanda Development Fund.  Under this scheme, public servants must pay a months‘ 
salary per annum (or a 12
th
 of their salary).  It has since been expanded for all salaried employees 
including those in the private sector.  While this payment is still called ‗voluntary‘, interviewees note 
that there is no such thing as a voluntary contribution, ―It is called voluntary but it is not.  Even X, he 
was told that he had to contribute and that he didn‟t have a choice. The umudugudu [village] chief 
came around with a list and said „this is what your neighbour paid‟. And he just had to do it. If you 
don‟t sign and pay, then you are in trouble.” 
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3.3.6  Participation, decentralisation and peacebuilding 
 
The findings from this overall section show some level of responsiveness at cell and sector levels to 
citizens‘ needs compared to district level where priorities more closely resemble those of national 
authorities and where links with citizens appear low to non-existent.  This points to weaknesses in 
the procedural system of participation at district level.  The higher level of dialogue and 
communication between sector and cell levels provides leaders with a more accurate sense of 
citizens‘ priorities although, mediating between these needs and those of their superiors, they are not 
always in a position to address these effectively.  Given this closeness to the population, it is perhaps 
surprising that citizens‘ use of local authorities is so low (see Figure 3.3.2c).  This suggests, despite 
local dialogue and communication, ongoing low levels of trust in and popular legitimacy for local 
leadership as argued elsewhere by both Desrosier and Thomson (2011) and the IRDP (2011b). 
 
The findings also show that the main form of participation employed within the Rwandan process is 
that of cost-sharing – both in labour and financially.  The manner in which this is implemented has a 
number of consequences for local relations.  First, as well as increasing financial pressures on 
households which are already on the margins, the fact that these financial demands are increasing; 
their apparent arbitrary nature; and the lack of clarity on where the balance of these funds ends up is 
leading to growing disquiet and concern among citizens which necessarily impacts on local leaders‘ 
legitimacy and support.  Second, local leaders‘ attitudes towards their citizens as they seek their 
involvement in this cost-sharing – exacerbated by pressures to meet ambitious imihigo targets – at 
times echo the condescending, paternalistic, prejudicial attitudes of the past which, as we have seen, 
constituted one of the important background factors to the genocide.  And third, the clientelist nature 
of political representation – both generally and in negotiations around welfare payments and taxation 
rates – necessarily favours certain individuals (the well connected, influential and powerful) over 
others (the marginalised and voiceless).  This impacts on both relations between leaders and their 
communities, but also on relations between and within communities themselves.  As certain 
individuals and households are privileged through their political contacts and networks, grievances 
fester and the cohesion and solidarity fostered through various reconciliation processes suffers.   
 
The implications for peacebuilding are clear.  As discussed in detail in the accompanying report on 
Local Governance, Conflict and Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
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, key 
ingredients for peacebuilding include a rebuilding of trust and confidence between citizens and the 
state; the promotion of equity and redistribution; and inclusive governance (driven by institutions 
and not individuals).  While Rwanda‘s decentralised process overall, rolled out equally across all 
provinces throughout the country, has aimed at regional equity in terms of service provision and 
institution building, its demands of, attitude toward, and impact on local communities remain 
problematic.  While many national level participants in this research argue that any problems are due 
to deficiencies in local capacity – among local officials and citizens alike – this research indicates 
that they are more systemic.  These points are discussed further in the final concluding section 
below. 
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5.    Conclusion and issues arising 
 
This research has examined the decentralisation process in Rwanda in the context of its overall aim 
of countering the social, economic and political marginalisation of citizens experienced pre-1994.  It 
has done so through both documentary analysis of relevant legislative and policy materials and 
through field research in six sites across the country employing a framework which differentiates 
between procedural participation (electoral participation); substantive participation (ongoing active 
participation in local decision making); and participation as cost-sharing (ongoing participation 
through financial contributions and voluntary labour).  The findings reveal four important things.  
 
First, although there is much talk among officials and commentators about bottom-up planning 
processes emanating from local village meetings (formerly ubudehe and now umuganda), and while 
such an ethos underpins the original Decentralisation Policy formulated in 2001, the accompanying 
legislation is somewhat scant in its references to such a form of participation, and indeed to 
mechanisms whereby this might take place.  The Presidential Order setting out the roles and 
functions of village, cell and sector structures emphasises their mobilisation and education roles but 
makes no mention of local planning while the law determining district organisation and function 
makes no provision for public reporting of either decisions taken or a budgetary breakdown. 
 
Second, a shift in emphasis within the programme over time is evident.  The current national strategy 
of fast-track economic development as a route out of poverty has been superimposed on the original 
goal of reconciliation and community building.  This is evident in the 2013 revisions to the 
Decentralisation Policy as well as in the shift from political decentralisation toward administrative 
decentralisation evidenced in the introduction of public management frameworks such as imihigo 
and the emphasis on the administrative capacity of local leaders.  It is also evident in the demise of 
the local planning function of ubudehe which is now a social categorisation mechanism with final 
categories being decided by cell leaders. 
 
Third, the findings from both the comparison of local official and community priorities and citizens‘ 
knowledge and use of local structures reveal no evidence of representation or accountability at 
district level where plans and policies appear heavily influenced by national prerogatives and where 
senior political figures are, paradoxically, both elected through the official system and strategically 
selected at national level.   However, these same findings reveal some evidence of responsiveness at 
sector and cell level where communications and contact with communities are more frequent.  
Although aware of community priority issues and needs, local officials are somewhat constrained in 
their capacity to address these however, due to pressures to meet the ambitious targets set out in their 
imihigos which draw from higher level plans and targets. 
 
And fourth, of the three forms of participation examined, participation as cost-sharing emerges as the 
most common, with increasing emphasis placed on this in recent years as local entities are 
encouraged to move toward fiscal autonomy and self-reliance.  The heavy emphasis on this form of 
participation is viewed as problematic in a number of respects.  The increase in financial 
contributions; their apparent arbitrary nature; and the lack of clarity on where the balance of these 
funds ends up is leading to growing disquiet and concern among citizens which necessarily impacts 
on local leaders‘ legitimacy and support.  In addition, local leaders‘ attitudes towards their citizens as 
they seek their involvement in this cost-sharing – exacerbated by pressures to meet ambitious 
imihigo targets – at times echo the condescending, paternalistic, prejudicial attitudes of the past 
which constituted one of the important background factors to the genocide.  Moreover, the clientelist 
nature of negotiations around welfare payments and taxation necessarily favours certain individuals 
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over others impacting on both relations between leaders and their communities, but also on relations 
between and within communities themselves.  As certain individuals and households are privileged 
through their political contacts and networks, grievances fester and the cohesion and solidarity 
fostered through various reconciliation processes suffers.   
 
For adherents and supporters of Rwanda‘s ever-evolving decentralisation process, three broad 
questions arise from these findings. 
 
First is the important but often overlooked fact that history matters.  In Section 3.1 some important 
parallels between views of the pre-1994 regime and the current one were highlighted – namely the 
broad perception within the development community of Rwanda as a developmental success story 
drawing from the state‘s strategic control of statistics and narratives around this; the prejudice of the 
evolués (among state and civil society officials alike) toward their rural, illiterate, underdeveloped 
brothers; and the use of decentralised structures to promote centralised interests and plans.  This, of 
course, is not to say that Rwanda today, nor indeed its decentralisation process, mirrors that of the 
past.  Nor is it to detract from the significant development achievements of the current government.  
Like the many domestic conflicts which play out under shiny tin roofs glinting in the sun in villages 
throughout the country, it is simply a reminder that shiny, modern veneers can mask deeper 
problems.  The development community has been blinded by this veneer before.  In this context, it is 
perhaps worth reflecting on how ―good enough‖ does ―good enough governance‖ need to be?  While 
international attention is turning to Rwanda‘s internal governance issues, this remains in relation to 
issues at a national level.  However, both history and contemporary peace research show that 
attention needs to be paid to local as well as national levels. 
 
An allied critical question at this juncture is whether ―fast-track development‖ is compatible with 
other peace-building objectives aimed at transforming the political space resulting in equity, social 
cohesion and local political legitimacy.  Some assert you can have it all but the findings from this 
study raise a number of problems with such an assumption.  Specifically, the pressures of a fast-track 
approach dependent on high levels of cost-sharing by citizens jeopardises the quality of the social 
contract between leaders and citizens and, by necessity (bottom-up development takes time), 
pressures local leaders to adopt less inclusive forms of governance.  Moreover, in a country where, 
by the government‘s own admission, patriarchy is endemic (MIGEPROF, 2010: 8) and where 
women outnumber men in small-scale farming by 2 million to 1.1 million (NISR, n.d.e: 28), 
questions need to be raised about the gendered (as well as class-based) effects of the government‘s 
rapid industrialisation strategy.  In this regard, the EICV Gender Report finding that over the past 
five years there has been a fall in the number of men working in agriculture but a rise in the number 
of women doing so is instructive (NISR, n.d.e: 28). 
 
In this context, when placing capacity and capacity building at the heart of supports to the process, 
the question needs to be posed - what and whose capacity are we talking about?  Is it the capacity of 
communities to substantively interact with detailed administrative policy and budgetary mechanisms 
within a complex system or is it the capacity of the system to engage with community members as 
equals, valuing their knowledge and analysis, and developing the capacity, skills and tools to 
translate this into the necessary policy and budgetary frameworks?   If the former, the futility as well 
as the dangers of the process are apparent as the problem then becomes the familiar, condescending 
one of an illiterate, uneducated population incapable of mastering the technical expertise required as 
expressed here by a national civil society agency representative.  
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What we do see lacking until now is we haven‟t got enlightened citizens who will know what 
has been planned so that they can call the leadership to account... We have a big percentage 
of an illiterate population and therefore they cannot hold the leadership to account at 
district, sector or at cell level because they are less competent.  Secondly most of those who 
have been to school do not have sufficient educational backgrounds. To master the auditing 
and all that, quantifying the volumes of work that are supposed to be done, and all that stuff. 
They are not competent.  
       
(Representative of national civil society agency, Kigali) 
 
If the latter, tools such as the promising early version of ubudehe need to be developed so that 
community priorities and analyses can not just be collated, but can genuinely form the basis of 
district and national plans.  Beyond lists, this means developing open, transparent criteria for 
prioritisation of both issues and analyses which are clear and communicated to all.  It means 
significant capacity building at national levels.  And, above all, it means challenging officials on 
what constitutes knowledge and transforming dominant views on – to paraphrase Chambers (1997) – 
―whose knowledge counts?‖.   
 
The challenges are clearly immense.  However, with these questions in mind, it is important to 
remember that decentralisation was not just the key mechanism through which communities were 
physically mobilised during the genocide, it was also (together with the aid industry more broadly), 
for decades running up to the genocide, one of the key mechanisms through which the conditions of 
structural violence (marginalisation, alienation, humiliation) that preceded and underpinned the 
genocide were disseminated and consolidated.  Decentralisation, like participation, is not, on its own, 
necessarily a good thing.  It depends on the underlying aims, ambitions and motivations of its 
adherents and supporters.  While it can certainly oppress, subjugate and alienate communities, 
leading to frustration, anger and physical revolt, it can also actively engage communities, opening 
new political spaces and leading to a renewal of the social contract between citizens and their leaders 
while building social cohesion and stability.  The important thing is to learn from and not replicate 
history.   
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Appendix I 
 
Map of Rwanda 
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Appendix II 
 
Imihigo for Nyamagabe district – 2012-13 
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Appendix III 
 
Members of the Village Executive Committee and the their responsibilities 
(Excerpts from RoR, 2006a) 
 
  a. Members of the Village Executive Committee  
 
 
Article: 11 
The Village shall be administered by the Executive Committee comprising of five (5) 
people: 
1° The Village Coordinator; 
2° The in-charge of social Affairs; 
3° The in-charge of security and Immigration and Migration in the Village; 
4° The in-charge of information and education; 
5° The in-charge of development. 
 
 
 
  b. Responsibilities of the Executive Committee  
Article: 12 
The Village Coordinator shall have the following responsibilities: 
1° Convene and chair Council and Executive Committee meetings; 
2° Monitor the implementation of decisions taken by the Council; 
3° Publicise and lead the implementation of Government policies and plans from higher 
echelons; 
4° Promote the culture of a harmonious relationship of all Village residents; 
5° Collect information on the crime of genocide and mobilise the population to participate 
in Gacaca Court sessions 
6° Fight domestic violence and injustice; 
7° Fight laziness and prostitution; 
8° Promote good family relations and culture; 
9° Coordinate activities of the Village Executive Committee; 
10° List family problems which would be discussed in the Village Council; 
11° Attend meetings of the Committee responsible for communal work (umuganda) at 
Cell level; 
12° Submit report to the Cell. 
 
 
Article: 13 
Responsibilities of the in-charge of Social Affairs and family relations at Village level: 
1° Mobilise the population to promote hygiene in their Village; 
2° Identify and advise parents of street children; 
3° Identify children who attend or don‘t attend school and advice them accordingly; 
4° Mobilise citizens to join associations and tontines; 
5° Put in place an adult literacy plan of action; 
6° Mobilise citizens on the family planning; 
7° Mobilise the population to prevent and fight pandemics; 
8° Identify the vulnerable in the Village; 
9° Promote harmonious relations in the family especially those which have experienced 
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domestic violence; 
10° Mobilise the population to join health insurance schemes; 
11° Submit a report to the in-charge of social affairs at cell level. 
 
 
Article: 14 
The In-charge of security, migration and immigration in the Village shall have the 
following responsibilities: 
1° Mobilise the population to keep their own security and that of their property by doing 
night patrols; 
2° Ensure security related decisions from higher authorities are implemented; 
3° Mobilise the population to keep their own security and help each other in times of 
danger; 
4° Receive and record in the relevant exercise book all visitors to the Village; 
5° Submit report to the person in-charge of security at Cell level. 
 
 
Article: 15 
The in-charge of information and training in the Village has the following 
responsibilities: 
1° Fight rumour mongering by providing factual information and submit report to in-
charge of information at Cell level; 
2° Collect information from the Village and submit it to his/her superior at Cell level 
through the Village Coordinator; 
3° Prepare an action plan to educate the population; 
4° Mobilise the population through civic education and factual information; 
5° Mobilise the population to be good citizens; 
6° Act as secretary to Village meetings. 
 
 
Article: 16 
The In-charge of development has the following responsibilities : 
1° Plan communal work (Umuganda) and mobilise the population to massively participate 
in it; 
2° Assist the Cell to access basic data; 
3° Mobilise the population to join associations to fight poverty; 
4° Mobilise the population to maintain infrastructure; 
5° Mobilise the population to protect the environment; 
6° Mobilise the population to start development activities and join associations; 
7° Submit report to the in-charge of development at Cell level. 
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